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Security and QoS are the two foremost features of sensor networks. Sensor
networks are deployed across various environments where an optimum level of security 
and QoS is ideally required. Measurement of service, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, has been a long-standing challenge to the community. 
We propose a novel approach – creation of service (Security, QoS) surfaces to 
identify vulnerabilities and QoS features present in a sensor network. A sensor network 
has been modeled along with the communication protocol employed to indicate how we 
can obtain an optimum level of security and QoS.
In our approach to determine a model for security of a sensor network we want a 
measure— at a lower abstraction level—that allows us to refer to very specific states (i.e., 
configurations) of a system. Given this intermediate viewpoint, we can see that there are 
certain system features that are more likely than others to be opportunities of attack. The 
counts of these “more likely to be attacked” system features determine a system’s 
attackability (possibility of being attacked - vulnerability). 
We extend the metric based on the notion of attack surface proposed for 
Operating Systems security in [1] to security of sensor network protocols. This metric 
takes into consideration the parameters present at the design level of a system: above the 
level of code, but below the level of the entire system. 
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These attack opportunities are classified into different abstract dimensions, which 
together define a system’s attack surface. Intuitively, the more exposed the attack 
surface, the more likely the system could be successfully attacked, and hence the more 
insecure it is. An attack surface is defined in terms of the system’s actions that are 
externally visible to the users and the system’s resources that are accessed or modified by 
the system’s actions. The dimensions across which an attack surface is defined are targets 
and enablers, channels and protocols, and a set of access rights.
This approach is extended to determine the QoS surface of a sensor network 
across the QoS dimensions identified. Intuitively, the more exposed the QoS surface, the 
more likely the system could provide a high degree of QoS. Similar to an attack surface, a 
QoS surface is defined in terms of the system’s actions that are externally visible to the 
users and the system’s resources that are accessed or modified by the system’s actions. 
The dimensions across which a QoS surface is defined are inhibitors, enhancers and 
bottlenecks.
We further extend this work by proposing an approach to calculate a single 
measure for security. Finally, we propose an approach to compare the security and QoS 
in sensor networks that contain multiple independent protocols. This allows us to increase 
or decrease the security or QoS levels in the different protocols. The dimensions of the 
service surfaces can be modified to enhance the service provided by the communication 
protocol.
The rest of the thesis is outlined as follows: 
In chapter 2, we provide the details of the metric employed for determining the attack 
surface of an operating system. The chapter also provides an example of how an attack 
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surface is modeled using the dimensions identified. In chapter 3, we provide a general 
overview of sensor network architecture, routing protocols, attacks that can be mounted 
on a sensor network, QoS challenges faced in the field of sensor networks and the 
network assumptions made for sensor networks.
In chapter 4, we provide the attack surfaces for the wanderer protocol along with 
the attacks that can be mounted on this protocol. We also provide an attack surface 
modeled on the wanderer + LEAP protocol to illustrate the feasibility of our metric. This 
chapter also provides the various attacks possible on the physical layer, transport layer 
along with suitable defense mechanisms identified.
In chapter 5, we provide the QoS surface for the On-Demand Delay Constrained 
Unicast Routing Protocol.  We provide the QoS features present in ODRP similar to 
attacks possible in chapter 4. In chapter 6, we provide an example to illustrate the two 




This chapter provides an overview of the key concepts involved in modeling the new 
metrics – attack surface and QoS surface. The chapter illustrates the previous work 
undertaken to understand the metric of an attack surface for operating systems. We make 
use of the key techniques illustrated to model our new metrics. The concepts – attack 
surface automata, vulnerabilities, attack surface measurement, comparisons are made use 
of in subsequent chapters to create an attack surface and QoS surface for sensor 
networks. 
The chapter provides a concise description of the previous work attempted in the 
modeling of attack surfaces for operating systems. The chapter explains the attack surface 
automata along with the dimensions that have been identified for modeling the attack 
surface for operating systems. The chapter illustrates two examples – Linux and 
Windows operating systems, with the respective attack surfaces, methods to decrease the 
attack surface. It also provides the results obtained when comparing different versions of 
the operating system based on the attack surface modeled.
Attack Surface Automata – A Preview
State machines, which will be called System and Threat, are used to represent the 
system and threat respectively. A state machine has a set of states, a set of initial states, a 
set of actions, and a state transition relation. An attack is modeled as a sequence of 
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executions of actions that ends in a state that satisfies the adversary’s goal, and in which 
one or more of the actions executed in an attack involves any vulnerability [2].
2.1 State Machines
A state machine, M = (S, I, A, T), is a four-tuple where S is a set of states, I is a set 
of initial states, A is a set of actions, and T is a transition relation. A state s ε S is a 
mapping from typed resources to their typed values:
s: ResM → ValM
A state transition, (s, a, s’), is the execution of action ‘a’ in state s resulting in 
state s’. A change in state means either a new resource is added to the mapping, a 
resource was deleted, or a resource changes in value. Each state transition is assumed to 
be atomic.
An execution of a state machine is the alternating sequence of states and action 
executions:
s0 a1 s1 a2 s2 . . . si−1 ai si . . .
Such that s0 ε I and i > 0, (si−1, ai, si) ε T.
 The behavior of a state machine, M, is the set of all its executions. This set is
denoted as set Beh (M). A state s is reachable if either s ε I or there is an execution, e ε 
Beh (M), such that s appears in e.
Actions are specified by pre- and post-conditions. For an action, a ε A, if a. pre 
and a. post denote a’s pre- and post-condition specifications, the subset of the transition 
relation, T, that involves only the action a is defined as follows:
a. T = {(s, a, s’): S ×A×S | a.pre(s)  a.post(s, s’)}
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Both the system under attack and the threat (adversary) are modeled as state machines:
System = (SS, IS, AS, TS)
Threat = (ST, IT, AT, TT)
The resources of a state machine, M, are partitioned into a set of local resources and a set 
of global resources,
ResM = ResLM U Res
G
M
The combination of the two state machines, ST = System X Threat, is defined by merging 
all the corresponding components:
 IST = IS U IT
 AST = AS U  AT
 TST = TS U TT













Finally, ValST = ValS U ValT
An adversary targets a system under attack to accomplish a goal:
System-Under-Attack = (System X Threat) × Goal
Goal is a predicate over all the states in SST. The goal of the adversary in the 
model of a system under attack is made explicit. In our context, i.e. in wireless sensor 
networks Threat is synonymous with the system’s “environment.” Thus, Threat is used to 
model environmental failures, due to benign or malicious actions, that affect a system’s 
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state. It can be inferred that the way to reduce the attack surface is to ensure that the 
behavior of System prohibits Threat from achieving its Goal.
2.2 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities share the common intuition that something in the actual behavior 
of the system deviates from the intended behavior. This can be represented formally by 
comparing the difference between the behaviors of two state machines [1]. 
Suppose there is a state machine that models the intended behavior and one that 
models the actual behavior:
Intend = (SInt, IInt, AInt, TInt)
Actual = (SAct, IAct, AAct, TAct)
The vulnerability difference set, Vul, is defined to be the difference in behaviors 
of the two machines:
Vul = Beh (Actual) − Beh (Intend)
An execution sequence in Vul arises from one or more differences between a component 
of the state machine Actual and the corresponding component of Intend, i.e. differences 
between the corresponding sets of (1) states(or more relevantly, reachable states), (2) 
initial states, (3) actions, or (4) transition relations. Any one of the above types of 
differences is referred to as vulnerabilities.
Let’s consider each of the cases associated with the vulnerabilities:
1. SAct − SInt ≠ ∅          (2.1)
A difference in state sets indicates that there are some states that are defined for 
Actual that are not intended to be defined for Intend. The difference may be due to 
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1. A resource that is in a state in Actual, but not in Intend 
2. A value allowed for resource in Actual that is not allowed for that resource in 
Intend. (A resource that is not in a state in Actual, but is in Intend is ok.)
The difference is not too serious if the states in the difference are not reachable by 
some transition in TAct. If they are reachable, then the difference in transition relations 
will pick up on this vulnerability. However, though the states are not reachable initially, 
there is a possibility that if any of the specifications for actions changes in the future they 
may become reachable, so it must be ensured that the set of reachable states in Actual is a 
subset of that of Intend.
2. IAct − IInt ≠ ∅ (2.2)
A difference in initial state sets shows that there is at least one state in which one
can start an execution when one ought not to. This situation can arise if
1. Resources are not initialized when they should be.
2. Resources are given incorrect initial values.
3. When there are resources in an initial actual state but not in any initial 
intended state.
3. AAct − AInt ≠ ∅ (2.3)
A difference in action sets shows that there are some actions that can be actually 
done that are not intended. These actions will surely lead to unexpected behavior. The 
difference will show up in the differences in the state transition relations.
9
4. TAct − TInt ≠ ∅ (2.4)
A difference in state transition sets indicates that there is at least one state 
transition allowed in Actual that should not be allowed according to Intend. This situation 
can arise if
1. The action sets are different 
2. The pre- and post-conditions for an action common to both action sets are 
different.
Case 2 occurs when AAct = AInt, 
Let us consider a given action a ε AInt. If a. TAct − a. TInt ≠∅ then there are some 
states in Actual in which a can be executed and not in Intend or which can be reached as 
a result of executing the action a in Actual and not in Intend.
Let aAct.pre, aInt.pre be the pre-conditions for the action a in Actual and Intend, 
respectively, and similarly for their post-conditions (aAct.post and aInt.post). In terms of 
pre- and post-conditions, no difference can arise for the transition relations if
 aAct.pre aInt.pre 
 aAct.post aInt.post
The system is inferred to be safe if the “actual” behavior is stronger than the 
“intended” behavior of the system i.e. the conditions are stronger for actions in Actual
when compared to that of the actions in Intend.
As per the assumptions made, Actual models the actual behavior of the system then the 
system combined with the Threat machine looks like:
System-Under-Attack = (Actual X Threat) × Goal as opposed to
System-Under-Attack = (Intend X Threat) × Goal
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If Intend was implemented correctly, Goal would not be achievable. If it were 
implemented correctly then Actual and Intend will be equivalent and no adversary can 
break the security features available for the intended behavior of the system.
2.3 Attacks
As described earlier, an attack is the means of exploiting any vulnerability [5]. An 
attack is modeled to be a sequence of action executions, at least one of which involves 
any vulnerability. To be precise, an attack, k, either starts in an unintended initial state or 
reaches an unintended state through one of the actions executed in k. An attack includes 
the execution of actions from both state machines, System and Threat. The difference 
between an arbitrary sequence of action executions and an attack is that an attack 
includes any one or both of the following two conditions
(1) The execution of an action whose actual behavior deviates from the intended
behavior.
 (2) The execution of an action, a ε AAct −AInt (≠ ∅).
In case (2), the set of unintended behaviors will include behaviors not in the set 
of intended behaviors since AAct ≠AInt.
For any given attack, k, the means of an attack is a set comprising of all actions in 
k and the set of all process and data resources accessed in performing each action of the 
attack k. The resources include all global and local resources accessed by each action in k 
and all parameters passed as arguments or returned as a result of each action executed for 
the attack k.
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2.4 Dimensions of an attack surface
An attack surface comprises of the following dimensions:
 Targets and Enablers
Targets are processes or data resources that an adversary aims to control, modify 
or compromise in a system.
These are the other processes or data resources that are used by the adversary to 
gain control and carry out its attack successfully in the system.
 Channels and Protocols
An adversary gains control over the resources through communication channels 
and protocols.
 Access rights
Control over processes or data resources is subject to constraints imposed by the 
system’s set of access rights.
2.4.1 Targets and Enablers
Let us consider a simple example of a virus attack to understand the dimensions 
of an attack surface clearly. 
Example:
The general steps involved in such an attack are: 
Step 1: Ship an executable (considered to be piece of data) within a carrier to a 
target machine.
Step 2: Use an enabler, e.g., a browser, to extract the payload (the executable) 
from the carrier.
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Step 3: Make use of an interpreter to execute the executable to cause a state 
change on the target machine.
The attacker’s goal may be to modify the state of the target machine, to use up its 
resources, or to set it up for future attacks. The goal of the attacker can be achieved on the 
completion of the three steps mentioned [1].
The existence of this type of a virus attack leads us to understand two special types of 
data resources.  
1. Executables is a distinguished type of data resource, they can be evaluated. 
Executables are associated with one or more eval functions, eval: executable →unit.
The same executable can be interpreted differently by different eval functions 
with distinct effects. The executables can be considered to be targets and controlling such 
a target involves the ability to call an eval function on it. The adversary calls the 
corresponding eval function for the executable, so that the pre-condition of the next step 
in the attack can be established as a side effect.  
2. Carriers are the second distinguished type of data resource. Executables are 
embedded in carriers. Specifically, carriers have a function extract payload: 
carrier → executable.
2.4.2 Channels and Protocols
A channel is a means of communicating information from a sender to a receiver 
(in the present scenario from an attacker to a target machine). Associated with each kind 
of channel is a protocol, the rules of exchanging information. 
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Channels are considered to be data resources. A channel shared between System 
and Threat machines is an element of ResGST in the combination of the two machines.
In an attack sequence, the Threat machine may establish a new message-passing 
channel, e.g., after scanning host machines (other sensor nodes). Future communication 
between the two machines, which aids in exploitation of the vulnerability present in the 
host machine.
2.4.3 Access rights
Access rights are associated with all resources. These access rights determine the 
type of access available on a particular resource. For executables, execution rights are 
associated. Similarly, rights are associated with channels (since they are considered to be 
data resources) and channel endpoints (since they are running processes).
Conceptually these rights can be modeled as a relation, suggestive of Lampson’s 
original access control matrix [6]:
Access C Principals × Res × Rights
Where Principals = Users U Processes, Res = Processes U Data.
When required, to represent conditional access rights, the above relation can be 
extended with a fourth dimension Conditions,
Access C Principals × Res × Rights × Conditions
An interesting subset of the Access relation is the Accounts set. Accounts can be 
data or process targets. An account is viewed as shorthand for a particular principal with 
a particular set of access rights. In the case of sensor networks, Accounts represent 
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principals, i.e., nodes and base stations. There are some special accounts that have default 
access rights (nodes) and accounts that have admin privileges (base stations).
Reducing the attack surface with respect to access rights is a special case of 
abiding by the Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the relevant rights to each of the 
principals that are allowed access to a given resource.
2.5 Attack Surface Measurement
The attack surface of a system consists of the set of system actions AS and the 
collective set of resources of each action a ε AS. A naive but impractical way of 
measuring the attack surface is to enumerate the set of system actions of a given system 
and count the number of resources in each of the action’s resource set. A meaningful way 
to measure the attack surface based on the attack classes of the system is provided. Then, 
given two versions, A and B, of a system their relative attack surface exposure with 
respect to the attack classes is compared.
Method
Consider a system with a fixed set, AS, of system actions, each specified in terms 
of pre- and post-conditions. In practice, a system’s API serves as the set of system 
actions.
Step 1: Identify the resources that are potential targets of attack from the given set of 
system actions AS. Let Type be the set of types of all these resources.
Step 2: Given a set, Prop, of properties of interest over the resources, induce a type 
hierarchy over the set, Type, of resource types identified in Step 1. Every leaf node in this 
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type hierarchy is an attack class of the system. Let Attack Class be the set of attack 
classes.
Step 3: Define a payoff function F: Attack Class  [0, 1] to assign payoffs to each attack 
class identified in Step 2.
Step 4: Choose some k attack classes from the attack classes identified in Step 2. 
Step 5: Compare the two versions of the system, A and B, with respect to these k attack 
classes to obtain their relative attack surface exposure.
Some notes on the steps involved in the method:
In Step 2, the knowledge of the system is used to state the properties of interest.
They will differ from system to system and they may change over time based on the 
evolving experience with a system as it evolves over time.
In Step 3, payoffs represent the likelihoods of attack. An attack class with a high 
payoff indicates that resources of that class are more likely to be attacked than resources 
of an attack class with a lower payoff. One naive way of assigning payoffs is to count the 
number of times a resource appears in the pre- and post-conditions of system actions; 
assigning higher payoffs to the resources having higher counts. Another way of assigning 
payoffs is based on a system’s reported history and providing higher payoffs to attack 
classes that appear in a greater number of vulnerability bulletins. A more sophisticated 
approach for defining a payoff function is to quantify the “damage” the adversary can 
effect if resources in a given attack class are compromised, e.g., in terms of cost to repair 
the system.
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Step 4 proves that measuring an attack surface in practice need not involve all the
attack classes of the system. Choose the top k attack classes of a system based on the
payoffs assigned in Step 3. 
In Step 5, there are many ways to use the attack classes to do the comparison. One 
simple way is to count the number of instances of each attack class in both versions and 
compare the numbers.
The higher the count for a given attack class, the more the attack surface exposure 
is for that class. Another way is to incorporate the payoffs identified in Step 3 as weights 
in these counts; e.g., count the weighted sum of all instances in each attack class with the 
same immediate super type, and compare the versions with respect to the super type, 
rather than its individual attack class subtypes. In other words, the attack surface 
contribution of a resource type T with attack classes S1, S2, Sk as its subtypes is given by
kΣ i=1 n (Si) ×wi
Where n (Si) is the number of instances of the attack class Si and wi is the payoff 
assigned to Si in Step 3. A more sophisticated comparison might take into account the 
interactions between various attack classes, e.g., compare the number of sockets opened 
by services running as root and ignore the other sockets in the system.
2.6 Reducing the Attack Surface
The formal model and measurement method has suggested ways in which the exposure of
an attack surface can be reduced:
• Reduce the number of system actions.
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• Remove known or potential system vulnerability by strengthening the pre- and post-
conditions of a system action, e.g., in a way that prevents the Goal of the Threat from 
ever being achieved.
• Eliminate an entire attack class.
• Reduce the number of instances of an attack class.
2.7 Linux Example
In this section, the results of measuring the attack surface of four versions of the Linux
operating system are described.
Step 1 of the method requires that all resources of the system that are potential
targets of attacks were identified. Since it is impractical to enumerate the set of system 
actions for Linux, and then identify all possible resources each action might access or 
modify, the set of resource types was derived indirectly. All resources that appear in the 
MITRE CVEs [31] as potential targets of attack were considered and their types were 
identified accordingly.
Figure 1: Linux Attack Classes
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In Step 2, a set of properties was defined over the resource types identified in Step 
1, and a type hierarchy over the extended set of resource types was induced. Every leaf 
node in this type hierarchy was an attack class, resulting in 14 attack classes for Linux. 
Fig3. 1 depicts the type hierarchy and the 14 Linux attack classes. For example, in the
type hierarchy, nobody account ≤ user account ≤ all resource and symbolic link ≤ all 
resource. Descriptive names were used for the types and subtypes to be suggestive of the 
properties used to induce the hierarchy.
In Step 3, the history of attacks on Linux based on CVEs was used to assign 
payoffs to the attack classes identified in Step 2. Explicit numeric payoff values were not 
assigned because there was no plan to use the numeric values in Steps 4 and 5. Instead, a 
higher payoff for an attack class was assumed if the resources of that attack class 
appeared a greater number of times in the CVEs. Note that counting the number of times 
a system appears in the CVEs is different from counting the number of times each attack 
class of the system appears in the CVEs. For example, consider two versions, A and B, of 
a system having ten attack classes and each appearing in 50 CVEs. Let two of the attack 
classes of version A appear in 25 CVEs each, ten of the attack classes of version B appear 
in 5 CVEs each, and the first two attack classes have lower payoffs compared to the 
remaining eight. Both A and B appear in same number of CVEs, but the attack surface 
exposure of B is more than that of A with respect to the ten attack classes.
In Step 4, 11 attack classes were chosen for attack surface measurement out of 
the 14 identified in Step 2. Three attack classes were not included in the measurement 
since it was not possible to count the number of instances of each of them for all four 
versions of Linux. 
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In Step 5, the number of instances, of each of the 11 attack classes was counted
for four versions of the Linux operating system and compared the numbers to get a 
relative measure of their attack surface.
2.7.1 Attack Classes
The resources appearing in the publicly known vulnerabilities reported in the 
CVEs and CVE candidates list of MITRE [10] were identified. Further information about 
the vulnerabilities was obtained from the CERT Advisories [12], Debian Security 
Advisories [10], and Red Hat Security Advisories [9] referenced in the CVEs. The types 
of these resources are categorized into 14 attack classes. Each attack class is described 
with an example (CVE) of a vulnerability of a resource in that attack class.
Linux Attack Classes
 Open TCP/UDP socket
 Open remote procedure call (RPC) endpoint
 Service running as root
 Service running as non-root
 The setuid (setgid) root program
 Enabled local user account
 The user id=root or group id=root account
 The unpassworded account
 Nobody account




 The httpd module
 The dynamic web page
2.7.2 Attack Class Validation
If the 14 attack classes are complete enough, then any vulnerability mentioned in
Bugtraq should be covered by one of the mentioned attack classes.
For example, the vulnerability entry in the Bugtraq database with bugtraqid 7769 
[9] [10] describes a format string vulnerability, stack overflow, and file corruption in the 
mod gzip module running in debug mode. The target of the attack involving the 
vulnerability is the resource mod gzip and it is an instance of the Linux attack class httpd 
module.
As another example, Bugtraqid 8732 [9] describes ASN.1 parsing vulnerabilities 
in OpenSSL which a remote attacker can exploit to cause a denial-of-service or to 
execute arbitrary code on the system. The resources that are the targets of this attack are 
the applications such as Ssh that use OpenSSL. Ssh is an instance of the Linux attack 
class service running as root.
2.7.3 Attack Surface Measurements
The results of measuring the attack surface of following four versions of the 
Linux operating system have been provided
• Debian is a Debian GNU/Linux 3.0r1 distribution obtained from Debian’s website [27].
• RH Default is a Red Hat 9.0 Linux distribution obtained from Red Hat’s website [32].
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• RH Facilities is a customized Red Hat 9.0 Linux distribution installed at CMU School 
of Computer Science.
• RH Used is an instance of RH Facilities after use by a graduate student for three 
months.
Table 1: Attack Surface Measurement Results
• Default comparison: Compare the attack surfaces of Debian and RH Default to 
measure the relative security of different flavors (versions) of the system.
• Customized usage-based comparison: Compare the attack surfaces of RH Default and 
RH Facilities to observe the change in the security level of a system based on its 
customization.
• Time-based comparison: Compare the attack surfaces of RH Facilities and RH Used to
monitor the security level of a system as it changes over time.
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2.7.4 Results
Debian vs. RH Default
As shown in Table 1, RH Default has higher counts in each of five attack classes, 
Debian has a higher count in one attack class, and both have the same counts in each of 
five attack classes. Hence the attack surface exposure of Red Hat is greater than that of 
Debian. Debian is perceived to be a more secure operating system and this is reflected in 
the measurement. Design choices play an important role in making a system more or less 
secure.
RH Default vs. RH Facilities
As shown in Table 1, RH Facilities has higher counts in each of seven attack 
classes, RH Default has higher counts in one attack class, and both have the same counts 
in each of three attack classes. The attack surface exposure of the facilities distribution is 
more than that of the default distribution. The facilities distribution is customized to make 
it more useful compared to the default distribution.
For example, it has the AFS file system installed. It has services such as lclaadmd, 
opshell, kopshell and terad installed for remote management and network backup. 
Installing these features increases the counts for the attack classes open TCP/UDP socket, 
service running as root, enabled local user account, etc. The results show that the attack 
surface exposure has increased with customization, thereby making the system less 
secure.
RH Facilities vs. RH Used
As shown in Table 1, RH Used has higher counts in each of four attack classes 
and both have the same counts in each of seven attack classes. The used version’s attack 
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surface exposure is greater than the initially installed version. The three-month use of the 
system increased the counts of the attack classes open TCP/UDP socket, service running 
as root, enabled local user account, and weak file permission. The results show that the 
attack surface exposure has increased over time making the system less secure.
2.8 Windows Example 
Howard identified a set of 17 RASQ vectors [1] [11] and defined a simple attack 
surface function to determine the relative attack surface of seven different versions of 
Windows.
2.8.1 Attack Vectors for Windows
 Open sockets
 Open RPC endpoints
 Open named pipes
 Services
 Services running by default
 Services running as SYSTEM
 Active Web handlers
 Active ISAPI filters
 Dynamic web pages
 Executable vdirs
 Enabled accounts
 Enabled accounts in admin group
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 Null sessions to pipes and shares
 Guest account enabled
 Weak ACLs in FS
 Weak ACLs in Registry




2.8.2 Attack Surface Calculation
In Howard’s calculation, the attack surface area is the sum of independent 
contributions from a set of channels types, a set of process target types, a set of data 
target types, a set of process enablers, all subject to the constraints of the access rights 
relation, A.
SURFA = SURFA ch + SURFA pt + SURFA dt + SURFA pe
This simple approach has a major advantage in that it allows the categories to be 
measured independently.
Analysis of Attack Surface Calculation
The two main conclusions to draw are that with respect to the 20 RASQ attack vectors
(1) The default version of a running Windows Server 2003 system is more secure than 
the default version of a running Windows 2000 system
 (2) A running Windows Server 2003 with IIS installed is only slightly less secure than a 
running Windows Server 2003 without IIS installed.
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While it is too early to draw any conclusions about Windows Server 2003, the 
RASQ numbers are consistent with observed behavior in several ways:
• Worms such as Code Red and Nimda spread through a variety of mechanisms. In 
particular, Windows NT 4.0 systems were at far greater risk of being successfully 
attacked by these worms if the systems were installed with IIS than if they were not. This 
observation is consistent with the increased RASQ of this less secure configuration.
• Windows 2000 security is generally perceived as being an improvement over Windows 
NT 4.0 security [10]; the differences in RASQ for the two versions in a similar 
configuration (i.e., with IIS enabled) reflect this perception.
• Conversely, Windows 2000 (unlike Windows NT 4.0) is shipped with IIS enabled by 
default, which means that the default system is actually more likely to be attacked.
This observation is consistent with anecdotal evidence that many Windows 2000 
users affected by Code Red and Nimda had no idea they were actually running IIS.
2.9 Conclusion
This novel approach of creating an attack surface to determine the secure features 
of a system can be extended to any application. This approach can be verified to be a 
feasible solution to detect the vulnerabilities in a system, and hence enhance the security 
associated with the system.
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CHAPTER III
SURFACES FOR SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we described attack surfaces to measure the security and 
vulnerabilities associated with operating systems. We extend this to determine the attack 
surfaces of sensor network communications protocols. This theory is extended to create a 
QoS surface for sensor networks. The attack surface and the QoS surface are created by 
considering two features of a sensor network, namely, sensor hardware, and routing 
(communication) protocols. This chapter describes the major concepts – architecture, 
routing protocols, attacks and QoS challenges related to sensor networks which will be 
considered to create the framework for the attack surface and the QoS surface.  
We first consider the architecture of a sensor network.
3.2 Architecture
Sensor networks have one or more points of centralized control called base 
stations. A base station is typically a gateway to another network, a powerful data 
processing or storage center, or an access point for human interface. They can be used as 
a nexus to disseminate control information into the network or extract data from it. In 
some sensor network routing protocols, base stations have also been referred to as sinks.
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Base stations are typically many orders of magnitude more powerful than sensor 
nodes. They might have workstation or laptop-class processors, memory, and storage, AC 
power, and high-bandwidth links for communication amongst themselves. However, 
sensor nodes are constrained to use lower-power, lower-bandwidth, shorter-range radios,
and so it is envisioned that the sensor nodes would form a multi-hop wireless network to 
allow sensors to communicate to the nearest base station. Fig. 3.1 illustrates a 
representative architecture for sensor networks.
Figure 2: Architecture of a Sensor Network
A sensor network consists of a large number of devices (nodes) that may or may 
not be mobile and measure an environmental variable such as temperature, pressure, 
radioactivity, or geographic position. The sensors are equipped with transceivers that 
enable them to transmit and receive data to and from other sensors. Any change in the 
environment triggers the need for communication between a regular sensor, and the base 
station. A communication session is assumed to consist of sending a single packet of data 
from the sensor node to the powerful sensor (base station); this assumption is possible as 
the data of an environmental variable only consist of a few bytes. If a node sends out its 
data packet, chances are that the packet will not reach the destination in a single hop due 
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to the limited transmission range of the source sensor node; in order to obtain a 
functioning system, other sensors that receive the packet transmitted by the source need 
to forward the data packet themselves until it reaches the destination, this mode of 
transmission makes use of the transmission range of the various intermediate nodes to 
forward the received packets to the destination.
Determining a solution about how to route a data packet has been the subject of 
intense study and research in ad-hoc networks. The attributes of a sensor network setting 
are
1. Limited battery power
2. High network node density
3. Frequent network topology changes
Whenever a source and a destination are given, most routing protocols—
particularly in ad-hoc networks—first compute a routing path and then route data packets 
along the computed path. Each node in the network—upon receiving a packet—
retransmits the packet to its neighbors with a certain probability according to the 
probability function [3]. While this basic principle is straight-forward, we must be careful 
not to overload the probability function: the retransmission probability depends on 
parameters as diverse as the numbers of copies of the packet already received by the 
sensor node or the distance to the destination. In order to keep the routing protocol as
light-weight as possible, the retransmission probability is kept as simple as possible with 
respect to the complexity required to compute or estimate the parameters that the 
probability function depends on.
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3.3 Routing Protocols
The routing protocols that can be employed on a sensor network can be broadly 
classified as multi path routing and single path routing protocols. Each protocol is 
provided with a payoff value (factor) to indicate its level of security. These pay off values 
are utilized in chapter 7, while measuring the attack and QoS surfaces.
3.3.1 Single Path Routing Protocols
The single path routing protocols make use of a single path of transmission from a 
particular sensor node to the base station. An example of such a routing path is shown in 
Figure 3
Figure 3: Single Path Routing Protocol
3.3.2 Multi Path Routing Protocols
The multi path routing protocols make use of multiple paths of transmission from 





 No link, no node sharing protocols (disjoint)
 Node sharing, no link sharing protocols
 Intertwined or Sharing protocols
Disjoint routing protocols
In this protocol the paths taken will be disjoint (unique). It will not consider the 
same nodes. Fig 4 shows an example of a disjoint routing protocol.
Figure 4: Disjoint Multi Path Routing Protocol
Node sharing, no link sharing protocols
In this protocol, the same nodes present in various paths can be used but the links 
(the sequence of transmissions is different) for each path. Figs 5 and 6  show an example 




(All previous nodes present as a subset in the new path with reference to the single 
path mode)
Figure 5: Node Sharing Multi Path Protocol
(A subset of the previous nodes present as a subset in the new path) 






Shared or intertwined paths
In this type of multi path routing protocols there is a sharing of nodes and links. 
Fig 7 illustrates such an example.
FIG 6: Shared or intertwined multi path routing protocol
Payoff Values
Payoff values for the above routing mechanisms:
 Disjoint paths – ‘a’
 No link, node sharing – ‘b’
 Intertwined – ‘c’
a ≥ b ≥ c
Disjoint paths are most secure because an adversary can never know which node will 




no sharing of resources among all the paths so an adversary can never decide its course of 
action.
Node sharing paths are the next in line. The adversary can never determine what the 
next node in the path will be, thus hindering its process of attacking. There is a small 
probability associated with the scheme that it can be attacked more easily than disjoint 
paths. Following the traces of the previous path taken, if the nodes of that path are 
attacked then there is an increased possibility that future transmissions can be tampered 
with.
Intertwined paths are the most insecure methods. Since an adversary can follow the 
paths taken by making use of the links from the previous paths taken for transmission, 
this mode has the maximum susceptibility to attacks. By watching the nodes that were 
accessed in the previous transmission it is possible for the adversary to compromise those 
nodes, this increases the possibility of the failure of the whole network. 
3.3.3 Types of network layer attacks
Most network layer attacks against sensor networks fall into one of the following 
categories:





 HELLO flood attacks
34
 Acknowledgement spoofing
Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information
This is the most direct attack against a routing protocol. It targets the routing 
information exchanged between nodes. By spoofing, altering, or replaying routing 
information, adversaries may be able to attract or repel network traffic, extend or shorten 
source routes, create routing loops, partition the network, increase end-to-end latency, 
generate false error messages, etc.
Selective forwarding
Sensor networks (multi-hop networks) are often based on the assumption that 
participating nodes will faithfully forward received messages. A simple form of this 
attack is when a malicious node behaves like a black hole and refuses to forward every 
packet it receives. However, neighboring nodes might conclude that the node (black hole)
has failed and seek another route. A more subtle form of this attack is when an adversary 
selectively forwards packets [4]. An adversary interested in limiting suspicions of it being 
compromised, can suppress or modify packets originating from a select few nodes and
reliably forward the remaining traffic. An adversary launching a selective forwarding 
attack will follow the path of least resistance and attempt to include itself on the actual 
path of the data flow.
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Sinkhole attacks
In a sinkhole attack, the adversary lures all traffic from a particular area to a 
compromised node, creating a metaphorical sinkhole with the adversary at the center.
Sinkhole attacks can enable many other attacks (selective forwarding, for example).
Sinkhole attacks work by making a compromised node look especially attractive 
to surrounding nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an adversary 
could spoof a high quality route to a base station. In this case, a laptop-class adversary 
with a powerful transmitter can actually provide a high-quality route (spoofed) by
transmitting with enough power to reach the base station in a single hop.
Sensor networks are susceptible to sinkhole attacks due to their specialized 
communication pattern. All packets share the same ultimate destination (in networks with 
only one base station), so a compromised (malicious) node only has to provide a single 
high-quality route to the base station in order to influence a potentially large number of 
nodes.
The Sybil attack
In a Sybil attack [2], a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in 
the network. The Sybil attack can significantly reduce the effectiveness of fault-tolerant 
schemes such as distributed storage [17], multi path [18] routing, and topology 
maintenance [20]. Routes believed to be using disjoint nodes could be actually using a 
single adversary presenting multiple identities. Sybil attacks also pose a significant threat 
to geographic routing protocols. Location aware routing often requires nodes to exchange 
coordinate information with their neighbors to efficiently route geographically addressed 
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packets. It is only reasonable to expect a node to accept a single set of coordinates from 
each of its neighbors, but by using the Sybil attack an adversary can ‘‘be in more than 
one place at once’’ [4].
Wormholes
In the wormhole attack [1], an adversary communicates messages received in one 
section of the network over a low-latency link and replays them in a different section. An 
adversary situated close to a base station may be able to completely disrupt routing by 
creating a well-placed wormhole. An adversary could convince nodes who actually are
multiple hops from the base station that they are only one or two hops away via the 
wormhole. This can create a sinkhole: since the adversary on the other side of the 
wormhole can artificially provide a high quality route to the base station, potentially all
traffic in the surrounding area will be drawn through it if alternate routes are significantly 
less attractive. Fig. 8 shows an example of a wormhole being used to create a sinkhole.
Figure 7: Adversary using a Wormhole to create a Sinkhole
More generally, wormholes can be used to exploit routing race conditions [4]. A 
routing race condition arises when a node takes some action based on the first instance of 
a message it receives and ignores later instances of that message. In such a case, an 
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adversary may be able to exert some influence on the resulting topology if it can cause a 
node to receive certain routing information before it would normally reach them through 
multi hop routing. Wormholes are a way to do carry out this sort of an attack (routing 
race conditions). Wormholes can also be used simply to convince two distant nodes that 
they are neighbors by relaying packets between the two of them.
HELLO flood attack
Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce their 
presence as neighbors in the vicinity, and a node receiving such a packet concludes that it 
is within (normal) radio range of the sender. This assumption may be rendered false if a 
laptop-class attacker broadcasts routing or other information, with sufficient transmission 
power it might result in every node in the network being convinced that the attacker is its
neighbor.
When an adversary advertises a very high-quality route to the base station (from 
its current position) to every other node in the network, the information could cause a 
large number of nodes attempt to use this high quality route. Thus nodes far away from 
the adversary would be sending packets into oblivion. The network is left in a state of 
confusion. Protocols which depend on localized information exchanged between the 
neighboring nodes of a sensor network for topology maintenance or flow control are 
subjected to this type of attack.
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Acknowledgement spoofing
Several sensor network routing algorithms rely on link layer acknowledgements.
An adversary can spoof link layer acknowledgments for ‘‘overheard’’ packets addressed 
to neighboring nodes. This spoofing of acknowledgements is to convince the sender that 
a weak link is strong or that a dead or disabled node is alive. For example, a routing 
protocol may select the next hop in a path using link reliability. Artificially reinforcing a 
weak or dead link is a subtle way of manipulating such a scheme [4]. Packets sent along 
weak or dead links are eventually lost; so, an adversary can mount a selective forwarding
attack using acknowledgement spoofing by encouraging the target node to transmit 
packets on those links.
3.3.4 QoS Challenges
 Bandwidth Limitation:
We need to decide upon the tradeoff with quality of service. Depending on this 
tradeoff we can split the traffic across various paths to meet the bandwidth 
requirements. The data packets are then aggregated to provide the data that was 
originally split.
 Removal of redundancy
When data is transferred across the network, data aggregation can be performed to 
prevent the redundant data from being transmitted across all different paths. This 
method removing redundant data paves the way for efficient resource utilizations.
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 Energy Vs Delay Tradeoff
A 1-hop transfer of data can result in quick transfer of data but it is more energy 
consuming [14] [15] [16]. A single node usually will not be provided with the 
required amount of power to perform this 1-hop operation. When multiple hops 
are the only option in the network, we will be able to conserve energy. Energy is 
conserved using this method because the power present in a single node is 
sufficient to transfer data to its neighboring nodes rather than to a distant 
destination node. Hence, the power provided for a single node will last longer 
than when using a single hop strategy. Using this multi-hop strategy will result in 
a greater delay in the transfer of data.
 Buffer size limitation
Buffering of multiple packets will aid in greater conservation of energy. When a 
node has to switch from receiver mode to sender mode it results in greater usage 
of power. So before switching modes it is an advantage if the packets that are 
directed towards it are received first. Though the above inference is advantageous 
it depends a lot on the buffer size. The buffer present in each individual node has 
to be sufficient to hold the aggregated data packets. If the buffer size is limited it 
will result in greater delay and much faster energy loss.
 Multiple Data Types – support
Energy and QOS requirements have to be satisfied for various types of data. This 
is a necessary component because when there are different types of data that will 
have to be communicated it results in the need for supporting them all. This last 
factor is application dependent.
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3.3.5 Threat models
There are two classes of attackers:
1. Mote-class attackers 
2. Laptop-class attackers. 
In the case of mote class attackers, the attacker has access to a few sensor nodes.
In contrast, a laptop-class attacker has access to more powerful devices, like laptops. 
Thus, when a laptop class attacker is present, malicious nodes may have an advantage 
over legitimate, uncompromised nodes - greater battery power, more efficient CPU, high-
power radio transmitter, sensitive antenna.
An ordinary sensor node has limited capabilities. Using its maximum resources it 
may be able to jam the radio link in its immediate vicinity, while a laptop-class attacker 
might be able to jam the radio link of the entire sensor network using its stronger
transmitter. A single laptop-class attacker might be able to eavesdrop on an entire 
network, while sensor nodes would ordinarily have a limited range. Also, laptop-class 
attackers might have a high-bandwidth, low-latency communications channel not 
available to ordinary sensor nodes, allowing such attackers to coordinate their efforts [4].
A second distinction can be made between outsider attacks and insider attacks. In 
outsider attacks, the attacker has no special access to the sensor network. In insider 
attacks, an authorized participant in the sensor network turns bad (malicious). Insider 
attacks can be carried out from either compromised sensor nodes running malicious code 
or adversaries who have compromised legitimate nodes (obtain key material, data), then 
use one or more laptop-class devices to attack the sensor network.
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3.3.6 Network assumptions
We assume that radio links are insecure in sensor networks. In the simplest mode 
of attack, attackers can eavesdrop on the radio transmissions, inject bits in the channel, 
and replay previously overheard packets. If the defender can deploy many sensor nodes, 
then the adversary will also be able to deploy a few malicious nodes with similar 
hardware capabilities as the legitimate nodes. The attacker may gain control by 
‘‘turning’’ a few legitimate nodes to malicious nodes by capturing them and physically 
overwriting their memory [5]. 
The attacker may gain control of more than one node, and all the malicious nodes 
might collude to attack the system. In some cases, colluding nodes might have high-
quality communications links available for coordinating their attack on the system. If an 
adversary compromises a sensor node (i.e. exploit the vulnerability present), it can extract 
all key material, data, and code stored on that compromised node. Providing extreme 
tamper resistance is a viable defense for physical node compromise in some networks but 
it cannot be considered as a general purpose solution, because tamper resistance tends to 
add a significant per-unit cost.
3.3.7 Trust requirements
Base stations interface a sensor network to the outside world. When a significant
number of base stations are compromised, the scenario renders the entire network useless. 
So, we assume that base stations are trustworthy and behave correctly. Most, routing 
protocols require nodes to trust messages from base stations [4].
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Aggregation points may be considered to be trusted components in certain 
protocols. Nodes relying on routing information from aggregation points trust that
messages sent to the aggregation points will be accurately combined with other messages 
and forwarded to a base station. This assumption is not considered reasonable due to the 
fact that aggregation points are often regular sensor nodes. So, it is possible for
adversaries to try and deploy malicious aggregation points or attempt to turn currently 
compromised nodes into aggregation points. So, aggregation points may not necessarily 
be trustworthy.
3.4 Security in sensor networks
A number of secure mechanisms have been proposed for sensor networks [4] [7] [8]. In 
particular we look at one key management scheme called LEAP [7] as we investigate the 
attack surfaces resulting from the introduction of LEAP key management into a routing 
protocol. 
LEAP
LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), is a key management 
protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing. This 
protocol restricts the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network 
neighborhood of the compromised node. LEAP supports the establishment of four types 
of keys for each sensor node – an individual key shared with the base station, a pair-wise 
key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring 
nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network
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The constrained energy budgets and the limited computational and 
communication capacities of sensor nodes make protocols such as TLS [13] and Kerberos 
[13] [18] proposed for wired networks impractical for use in large scale sensor networks. 
At present, the most practical approach for bootstrapping secret keys in sensor networks 
is to use pre-deployed keying in which keys are loaded into sensor nodes before they are 
deployed.
The packets exchanged by nodes in a sensor network can be classified into several 
categories based on different criteria, e.g. control packets versus data packets, broadcast 
packets versus unicast packets, queries or commands versus sensor readings, etc. The 
security requirements for a packet will typically depend on the category it falls in. 
Authentication is required for all types of packets, whereas confidentiality may only be
required for some types of packets. For example, routing control information usually does 
not require confidentiality, whereas (aggregated) readings reported by a sensor node and 
the queries sent by the base station may require confidentiality. We argue that no single 




Every node has a unique key that it shares with the base station. This key is used 
for secure communication between the node and the base station. For example, a node
can use its individual key to compute message authentication codes (MACs) for its 
sensed readings if the readings are to be verified by the base station. A node may also 
send an alert to the base station if it observes any abnormal or unexpected behavior of 
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a neighboring node. Similarly, the base station can use this key to encrypt any 
sensitive information, e.g. keying material or special instruction, it sends to an 
individual node.
Every node has an individual key that is only shared with the base station. This 
key is generated and pre-loaded into each node prior to its deployment.
 Group Key
This is a globally shared key that is used by the base station for encrypting 
messages that are broadcast to the whole group. For example, the base station issues 
missions, sends queries and interests. From the confidentiality point of view there is 
no advantage to separately encrypting a broadcast message using the individual key
of each node. However, since the group key is shared among all the nodes in the 
network, an efficient re-keying mechanism is necessary for updating this key after a 
compromised node is revoked.
 Cluster Key
A cluster key is a key shared by a node and all its neighbors, and it is mainly used 
for securing locally broadcast messages, e.g., routing control information, or securing 
sensor messages which can benefit from passive participation. Research has shown
that in-network processing techniques, including data aggregation and passive 
participation are very important for saving energy consumption in sensor networks. 
For example, a node that overhears a neighboring sensor node transmitting the same 
reading as its own current reading can elect to not transmit the same. In responding to 
aggregation operations such as MAX, a node can also suppress its own reading if its 
reading is not larger than an overheard one. Clearly, for passive participation to be 
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feasible, sensor nodes should be able to decrypt or verify some classes of messages, 
e.g., sensor readings, transmitted by their neighbors. This requires that such messages
be encrypted or authenticated by a locally shared key. As such, LEAP provides each 
node a unique cluster key shared with all its neighbors for securing its messages. Its 
neighbors use the same key for decrypting or verifying its messages.
 Pair-wise Shared Key
Every node shares a pair-wise key with each of its immediate neighbors. In 
LEAP, pair-wise keys are used for securing communications that require privacy or 
source authentication. For example, a node can use its pair-wise keys to secure the 
distribution of its cluster key to its neighbors, or to secure the transmission of its 
sensor readings to an aggregation node. Note that the use of pair-wise keys precludes
passive participation.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided the major concepts which will be referred to while creating 
the framework for the attack surfaces and QoS surfaces. The chapter describes the 
relationship between creating a security (or service) surface with the major properties of 
sensor networks. The following chapters illustrate the routing protocol functioning and 
the definitions for the dimensions of the respective surfaces.
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CHAPTER IV
ATTACK SURFACE FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the parameters and features involved in our approach to 
model an attack surface for the sensor network system. The attack surface is modeled by 
determining the dimensions of the sensor network. We study the intrinsic details of the 
communication protocol by making use of state transition diagrams. This state transition 
diagram provides us with the surface model details – states, transitions, initial states, 
actions. The approach takes models of common attacks to indicate the vulnerabilities 
associated with the protocol.
 The chapter deals with Wanderer protocol to describe the method of modeling 
the attack surface. Once the attack surface has been modeled, we will be able to identify 
the attacks that can happen in the sensor network. A dimension (rules of access) is 
enhanced in the Wanderer + LEAP protocol to study the vulnerabilities of the new 
protocol. A comparison is made between the two versions of the protocol to indicate the 




The wanderer protocol has been chosen to illustrate the creation of an attack 
surface of the sensor network as in section 3.2. The wanderer protocol is a simple 
protocol that enables us to deploy the idea of an attack surface on a sensor network. The 
simple features of this protocol are a result of the work carried out in [14] [15] [18].
4.2.1 Salient Features of the Wanderer protocol
1. Each node maintains a list of neighbors available and not the whole network 
topology.
2. Although packets are broadcasted, one neighbor is chosen from the list as the 
receiver and only that node retransmits the received packet. A random choice of a 
sensor node is made from the list of neighbor nodes to be designated as the 
receiver. This random choice is governed by the random function which is usually 
application-oriented. 
3. The random choice is not always a good choice; number of retransmissions of the 
same packet will vary with the different choices obtained for the receiver
designated using the random function. Sometimes, the taken path may be farther 
away from the destination, in which case the base station requests the packet 
again from the sensor node (this is actually based on a timeout value for the 
message request and receive operation). 
4. A node may receive the same packet many times; each node keeps track of the 
number of times it has forwarded a particular packet. A number, called duplicate-
forwarding parameter determines the number of times a packet can be forwarded 
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by a node. This duplicate forwarding parameter is set by the system design 
specifications.
4.2.2 Working of the Wanderer protocol
The intrinsic working details of the wanderer protocol are represented as a state 
transition diagram of the protocol. We have provided the protocol in a form similar to an 
automaton where we can see each stage the sensor network enters when there is 
transmission of data. Security issues will become apparent from the representation.
Figure 8: State Transition Diagram for Wanderer Protocol
















This is the state which represents the initial state of the sensor network. No 
transmissions take place in this state. The sensor network just waits for some events 
to take place so that transmission of data packets is necessary to report the events. 
The leaf nodes may also be waiting for a request message from a base station. Upon 
receiving a message from the base station the leaf node enters the next stage to 
transmit the requested information. 
 B
This is the stage which represents that the request message from the base station 
has been received by the leaf node. This is the stage, which also corresponds to the 
necessity of leaf nodes having to transmit data packets to report the occurrence of 
events to the base station. Usually there are intervals of time during which when 
certain events occur a leaf node will have to transmit data packets to the base station. 
 C 
This is the stage where the leaf node has the required information for 
transmission. The information to be transmitted will be suitably wrapped into data 
packets in the following stages which will be interpreted by the base station as the 
occurrence of certain events.
 D
This stage corresponds to the availability of the neighbor list in the leaf node. A 
neighbor list is obtained by the transmission of HELLO packets by each node to its 
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neighbor nodes. A neighbor list is required so that the ‘receiver’ can be chosen to be 
the next node in the routing path.
 E 
This stage is responsible for packing the information requested into packets. 
These packets can be interpreted by the base station to correspond to various 
scenarios and events. 
 F
The receiver is determined using the random function from the neighbor list. Care 
is taken so that the sender is not again chosen to be the receiver else the packet may 
just loop across the two nodes without traversing in the forward direction. This is 
explained below.
 G
The ID of the source leaf node is also added to the packet to prevent the looping 
of the packets between the 2 nodes. The ID of the receiver chosen using the random 
function is stored along with the packet. This ID is added to the packet so that only 
the receiver can transmit the packets to its neighbors. This is the policy used in the 
wanderer protocol. 
(Source ID + Receiver ID + Packet)
 H
The packet is transmitted to all the neighbor nodes present in the neighbor list.
Each neighbor node receives the transmitted packet but confirms its identity as the 
receiver before transmitting the packet again.
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 I
The source node ID is stripped from the packet so that the receiver for the next 
stage of transmission will not be the source node, in order to prevent a loop of the 
source and neighbor node while making use of the receiver function.
 J
The receiver has the packet ready for further transmission. All the IDs which were 
initially packed with the data packet are stripped off. Thus the packet is ready for 
transmission to the next node on the routing path. The packet is now added with the 
original source ID, the current node ID, the new Receiver node ID.
      (Source ID +Intermediate ID+ new Receiver ID + Packet)
 K
This is the final stage of the routing protocol where in the sensor network, the 
required packet has been received at the base station. After the packet has been 
received at the base station the network enters the initial state A.
Actions:
1 – Message transmitted from the base station to the individual sensor node
2 – Information to be sent is collected
3 – Dynamic update of the neighbors list
4 – Attach the source ID
5 – Make use of the random function to determine the receiver
6 – Attach the receiver ID
7 – Transmit the packet to all neighbors
8 – Check if the current node is the receiver node ID
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9 – Attach the node’s ID as the current intermediate node ID 
10 – The information is ready for transmission
11 – If the destination is the base station then the sensor network reaches its final state
12 – Timeout makes the base station, request for information from the sensor node, the 
base station after a network specific time interval, in the event of failure to receive the 
requested information, re – initiates the information request process.
4.2.3 Transmissions
 It is preferred to obtain a new node as a receiver; by using the random function 
i.e. priority is given to the new node rather than the immediate source (the node 
which transmitted the packet to the current active node in the first place). The 
immediate source is usually prevented from being the receiver; else there is a 
possibility of cycles present between the nodes which is not a desired facet of the 
protocol.
 At any instant of time there can only be one node with an active status. A node 
becomes the active node when it receives a packet from another node. The 
information of the immediate source is usually stored at each active node, so that 
it can be made use of while choosing a receiver.
4.2.4 Attacks on the Wanderer protocol
 Selective forwarding – a compromised node can selectively forward packets.
 Wormhole – between the receiver and the adversary so that sensitive information 
can be transferred to the adversary.
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 HELLO – the adversary makes the receiver become a neighbor to all nodes by 
transmitting HELLO packets. This is made possible because of the huge amounts 
of power available for disposal from the adversary.
 Sybil attack – the adversary makes the compromised node a neighbor to all other 
nodes by posing different suitable identities. This increases the probability of this 
compromised node being chosen as the receiver using the random function.
 Sinkhole attack – the compromised nodes can be deployed as sinkholes by the 
adversary. Packets sent to the compromised nodes are lost. When the number of 
compromised nodes increases in a sensor network, the sinkhole attack can bring 
down the whole network.
A detailed description of the attacks has been provided in chapter 3.
4.2.5 Vulnerabilities
An attack is the sequence of events initiated by an adversary. The adversary aims 
to gather sensitive information or affect the normal working of the communication 
protocol in use. Vulnerability is the state of the sensor network that aids in the adversary 
mounting an attack. Let us consider the wanderer routing protocol and illustrate some of 
the vulnerabilities associated with the protocol.
 Each node stores a list of its neighbors. This list of neighbors is updated 
dynamically, when the node becomes an active node. This dynamic update 
enables the addition of new neighbor nodes to the list; it also introduces the 
problem - the adversaries can mount HELLO, Sybil attacks.
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 The random function that determines the receiver from the set of neighbors is a 
possible vulnerability. This random function can be made obsolete by an 
adversary by mounting the Sybil attack (section 3.3.3). The adversary can also 
compromise the random function involved. A compromised node can have its 
own version of the random function which enables only compromised nodes 
available in the neighbors list to be selected as the receiver.
 There is a vulnerability associated with the trust placed on the receiver to transmit 
correctly. If the receiver had been compromised then it results in a total failure of 
the routing protocol in the sensor network.
4.2.6 Measure of vulnerability
Taking into consideration the attack surface automata introduced in Section 2.2, 
we obtain the following scenarios.
Vul = Behavior (Actual) – Behavior (Intend)
 Sa – Si ≠ 0
S is the set of states present in a state transition diagram as presented by equation 
2.1
Any state S is a mapping from resources to their typed values.
S: Resources  Values
Resources refer to the physical hardware and its specifications available 
for each sensor node. Values refer to the actual data contained in each of the 




1. Message packet sent to adversary through the sinkhole/wormhole.
Route is the resource
The value is the actual route taken (sinkhole/wormhole or normal correct 
route)
2. A change in the neighbor list
Resource is neighbor list
Values is the neighbors in the list
3. The random function available for selecting the receiver is compromised.
Resource is the random function
Values is the result of the random function
For the above three examples we can see that when the protocol enters a state 
which requires a generation of a new neighbor list (Sa) when not intended for the correct 
functioning of the protocol (Si), we will be able to identify the difference in the 
functioning of the protocols due to the attacks mounted.
Sa is the set of states the protocol enters as a result of an attack being mounted 
upon and Si is the set of states the protocol will enter as a result of its secure functioning 
i.e. no attacks are mounted.
For example:
The intended set of neighbors in state D above is Ni
The actual set of neighbors in state D is Na (this is a state D’)
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Therefore the set of intended states will be A,B,C,D,E … and actual states will be 
A’,B’,C’,D’.…. The states are therefore different due to the different values of the 
resources.
Sa  Si is a desired property. An illustration of the states Sa and Si is provided in 
section 4.5
 Ia – Ii ≠ 0
I is the set of initial states present in a state transition diagram as presented by 
equation 2.2
Examples:
1. A change in the neighbors list makes the random function yield different 
results for a new action of transmission.
2. When a node has been compromised it can make sure that it is always 
chosen as the initial state by mounting a Sybil attack.
The initial actual neighbor list may be different from the intended list. 
In the above examples we can see that when an attack is mounted and the random 
function has been compromised, only compromised nodes can be chosen as the receiver 
node (Ii). So the initial states differ for each invocation of the compromised random 
function. The correct functioning for the protocol will involve the uncompromised 
receiver nodes in the initial states (Ii). This provides a difference between the actual and 
the intended functioning of the protocol.
Ia is the set of states the random function chooses receivers as a result of an attack 
being mounted upon and Ii is the set of states the random function will choose as 
receivers because of its secure functioning i.e. no attacks are mounted.
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 Aa – Ai ≠ 0
A is the set of actions present in a state transition diagram as presented by 
equation 2.3
Examples:
1. The communication with an adversary is always not intended.
2. Requirement to change a neighbors list when not intended.
3. The random selection function becomes obsolete
4. The attachment of a wrong receiver id 
Communication initiated between a receiver node and a compromised node when 
not intended (Aa) indicates the mounting of an attack, since this actual communication is 
not intended for the secure functioning of the protocol (Ai). The difference in such 
actions sets can help us to identify the security breaches made by an adversary on the 
sensor network. For example, attaching a wrong receiver id is indicative of a spoofing 
attack. Hence the list of intended versus actual becomes different. 
Aa is the set of actions present in the execution of a protocol as a result of an 
attack being mounted upon and Ai is the set of actions present in the execution of a 
protocol because of its secure functioning i.e. no attacks are mounted.
 Ta – Ti ≠ 0
T is the set of transition functions present in a state transition diagram as 
presented by equation 2.4
1. Action sets different




Message available, ready for transmission, obtain the receiver information 
using the random function.
      Post condition
Source id is stored, message ready for retransmission.
The above example refers to the state F in figure 8, when the packet has to be 
transmitted to the receiver chosen by the random function. When a sensor node has been 
compromised, and the sensor network enters the state F, the precondition is that the 
compromised node has been chosen as the receiver from the immediate source sensor 
node. The post condition is other compromised nodes are present with a higher 
probability of being chosen as the receiver by the random function.
Ti is the set of transitions which were intended for the secure functioning of the 
protocol and Ta is the set of transitions that resulted from the mounting of an attack. A 
transition function‘t’ is an element of Ti when it follows the normal functioning of the 
protocol. Some examples are when the uncompromised random function is used to 
identify the receiver node (the post conditions and preconditions present indicates the 
absence of an attack).
Ta is the set of transitions the protocol makes use of as it switches from one state 
to another as a result of an attack being mounted upon and Ti is the set of transitions; the 
protocol makes use of as a result of its secure functioning i.e. no attacks are mounted.
Usually the Intend operation of the protocols has lower bounds on the various 
parameters involved for the correct operation of the protocol. If the conditions/constraints 
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present on the parameters for the Actual operation of the protocol are a subset of the 
Intend conditions then we can conclude that the working of the protocol is secure against 
attacks. If the conditions present for the Actual operation is a subset of the conditions 
present for the Intend operation, it is an ideal scenario where the actual working of the 
protocol is more secure than the intended working of the protocol. In the case of the 
wanderer protocol, if the preconditions of the Actual operation of the described example, 
was that of an uncompromised node being chosen as the receiver using the 
uncompromised random function, it is a subset of the conditions that will have to be 
satisfied for the Intended operation of the protocol. The Intended operation of the 
protocol comprises of all the conditions to be satisfied for the ideal secure working of the 
protocol – means to always chose an uncompromised node as the receiver. 
The measure of vulnerability is the difference between the actual and intended 
states of the dimensions identified for the protocol in execution. This measure enables us 
to identify potential breaches of security.
Scenario VS Reality
Let us consider a scenario where ‘n’ attacks are mounted on a sensor network. 
Once the ‘n’ attacks have been mounted, it results in the total failure of the system. In 
reality, it indicates that the pre and post conditions involved for an attack ‘I’ to be 
mounted are available in the sensor network before the attack is mounted as shown 
below.
Scenario:
Attack 1  Attack 2  Attack 3  …Attack ‘n’ Total Failure of the system.
Reality:
Pre A1A1Post A1, Pre A2A2Post A2, Pre A3 …Post ‘n-1’,Pre ‘ n’A ’n’Post ‘n’ Failure.
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In the case of the wanderer protocol, 
Scenario:
 HELLO  Sinkhole  Wormhole  Total Failure of the system
Reality:
PreHELLO  HELLO  PostHELLO, PreSinkhole  Sinkhole  PostSinkhole, PreWormhole 
Wormhole  PostWormhole Total Failure of System
4.2.7 Dimensions of an attack surface
The earlier sections of the chapter depict the various features of the wanderer 
protocol that will have to be considered while creating an attack surface. This chapter 
illustrates the dimensions of the attack surface for the sensor network employing the 
Wanderer protocol. We have identified three dimensions to create an attack surface for 
the sensor network. The features that are vulnerable or secure against attacks have been 
classified according to the dimensions identified.
Targets and Enablers
If there are n sensor nodes available in the network then we have n targets and 
enablers.
 Any one node can be chosen as the target and the remaining set of nodes ‘en’ 
contained in the set of the remaining (n-1) nodes can be used as enablers. The enablers 
are made use of to compromise the target node – change the random function, change the 
neighbors list, wormhole, sinkhole, Sybil attacks. An adversary can make use of the 
neighboring nodes (enablers) of the target node to propagate its compromised random 
function as the new random function to be used for future transmissions.
61
A compromised node can be used to compromise the other nodes which will 
result in total failure of the system.
Channels and Protocols
Radio signals are transmitted and received by ordinary message passing 
mechanisms. The n sensor nodes are considered to be of the same type with similar 
configurations while the base station has a different configuration.
A new channel can be opened or set up by the adversary under such 
circumstances then there are chances of wormhole, sinkhole attacks.
Protocols
 The source of the packet is stored along with the packet during transmissions.
 The source id is stripped from the packet.
 The source id is stored to be used in the random function so that a new node can 
be chosen as the receiver.
Rules of Access (Protection layer):
This is the new dimension that has been added to characterize the attack surface of a 
sensor network. 
 Nodes with the ability to receive and transmit packets on a particular frequency 
are allowed access to the sensor network.
 Geographical distance between the node and the sensor network places an 
important access rule on the node.
 Encryption/Decryption of messages acts as a protection layer against attacks. This 
rule of access is not present in the Wanderer protocol, but it will become clear in 
the following section of the Wanderer + LEAP (Localized Encryption and 
Authentication Protocol) [7], a key management protocol for sensor networks was
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designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the 
security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of 
the compromised node)
 Ability to perform the required operations (application oriented) is also one access 
rule. (There is a possibility that an adversary can pose as a component node till an 
attack has been mounted).
4.3 Threat Models
This section illustrates the attacks possible on a sensor network deploying the 
Wanderer protocol. Making use of the transition diagrams from a high level 
perspective, we will be able to identify the vulnerabilities associated with the sensor 
network. We take into consideration the common attacks possible on a sensor 
network. The threats that have been illustrated are:





A high level transition diagram is provided for the wanderer protocol. This 
diagram provides us with a simplistic overview of the Wanderer protocol in action. This 
high level diagram enables us to understand and identify the vulnerabilities associated 
with the protocol. The identification is performed by matching the states of the high level 
diagram with the transition diagrams of the attack models.
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Figure 9: High Level Transition Diagram for Wanderer Protocol
States:
A – The initial state of the sensor network
B – Transmission of packets has to be initiated
C – Neighbor node list is available for choosing the receiver
D – The packet is transmitted to the receiver
E – The packet reaches the destination (base station)
Actions:
1 – The base station has requested information from the sensor nodes
2 – The neighbor list is created
3 – The receiver is chosen from the neighbor list using the random function available at 
the node
4 – The final transmission of the packet to the base station
5 – After transmission of the packet the sensor network enters the initial stage A
6 – Intermediate transmissions between the sensor nodes, before the packet reaches the 
base station




4.3.2 HELLO / Sybil attack model
Figure 10: HELLO/ Sybil Attack Model
States:
A – The initial state of the sensor network, packets have to be transmitted
B – HELLO/ Sybil attack so compromised nodes are present to be available on the 
neighbor list
C – Neighbor node list is available for choosing the receiver, which may have 
compromised nodes from the Sybil/HELLO attacks
D – The packet is transmitted to the receiver, an uncompromised node has been chosen as 
the receiver
F – The packet is transmitted to a compromised node that has been chosen as the receiver
G – Selective forwarding or sinkholes, wormholes affect the normal functioning of the 
network.
E – The packet reaches the destination (base station)









1 – The base station has requested information from the sensor nodes
2 – Compromised nodes relay HELLO packets to indicate their false presence as 
neighbors to the source node.
3 – The neighbor list is created. The receiver is chosen from the neighbor list using the 
random function available at the node
4 – The final transmission of the packet to the base station
5 – After mounting an attack, the sensor network is allowed to return to its original state 
so that suspicions are not raised.
6 – Intermediate transmissions between the sensor nodes, before the packet reaches the 
base station
7 – A compromised node is chosen by the random function to be the receiver
8 – The packet is transmitted to the compromised receiver
9 – After transmission of the packet the sensor network enters the initial stage A
4.3.3 Sinkhole attack model
Sinkholes are mounted by HELLO/Sybil attacks. The compromised nodes are 
made to act as sink holes so that the data packets are dropped or selectively forwarded to 
avoid suspicion. Over a period of time all the nodes in the network can be compromised 
to bring down the whole network. The compromised nodes are present as different nodes 
in the neighbor list thus affecting the normal functioning of the random function.
States:
A – The initial state of the sensor network, packets have to be transmitted
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B – HELLO/ Sybil attack so compromised nodes are present to be available on the 
neighbor list
C – Neighbor node list is available for choosing the receiver, which may have 
compromised nodes from the Sybil/HELLO attacks
D – The packet is transmitted to the receiver, an uncompromised node has been chosen as 
the receiver
F – The packet is transmitted to a compromised node that has been chosen as the receiver
G – Sinkholes thus created affect the normal functioning of the network.
E – The packet reaches the destination (base station)
Figure 11: Sinkhole Attack Model
Actions:
1 – The base station has requested information from the sensor nodes
2 – Compromised nodes relay HELLO packets to indicate their false presence as 
neighbors to the source node.








3 – The neighbor list is created. The receiver is chosen from the neighbor list using the 
random function available at the node
4 – The final transmission of the packet to the base station
5 – After mounting an attack, the sensor network is allowed to return to its original state 
so that suspicions are not raised.
6 – Intermediate transmissions between the sensor nodes, before the packet reaches the 
base station
7 – A compromised node is chosen by the random function to be the receiver
8 – The packet is transmitted to the compromised receiver
9 – After transmission of the packet the sensor network enters the initial stage A
4.3.4 Wormholes threat model
Wormholes are mounted by HELLO/Sybil attacks. The compromised nodes are 
made to act as ends of the wormhole so that the data packets are routed to adversaries. 
Over a period of time all the nodes in the network can be compromised to bring down the 
whole network [19]. The compromised nodes are present as different nodes in the 
neighbor list thus affecting the normal functioning of the random function.
States:
A – The initial state of the sensor network, packets have to be transmitted
B – HELLO/ Sybil attack so compromised nodes are present to be available on the 
neighbor list
C – Neighbor node list is available for choosing the receiver, which may have 
compromised nodes from the Sybil/HELLO attacks
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D – The packet is transmitted to the receiver, an uncompromised node has been chosen as 
the receiver
F – The packet is transmitted to a compromised node that has been chosen as the receiver
G – Sinkholes thus created affect the normal functioning of the network.
E – The packet reaches the destination (base station)
Actions:
1 – The base station has requested information from the sensor nodes
2 – Compromised nodes relay HELLO packets to indicate their false presence as 
neighbors to the source node.
3 – The neighbor list is created. The receiver is chosen from the neighbor list using the 
random function available at the node
4 – The final transmission of the packet to the base station
5 – After mounting an attack, the sensor network is not allowed to return to its original 
state. Any transmission will consider the two ends of the wormhole as neighbors. So 
finally all transmissions will be routed to an adversary through the wormhole. 
6 – Intermediate transmissions between the sensor nodes, before the packet reaches the 
base station
7 – A compromised node is chosen by the random function to be the receiver
8 – The packet is transmitted to the compromised receiver.
9 – After transmission of the packet the sensor network enters the initial stage A
10 – After a wormhole has been established the sensor network is allowed to reach its 
initial stage to avoid suspicion thereby getting access to future transmissions.
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Figure 12: Wormhole Attack Model
In section 4.5, the attack surface model and its feasibility can be easily 
understood. 
Whenever an attack is mounted on the wanderer protocol, the random function 
present at each compromised node is modified. Any attack on the sensor network 
deploying the wanderer protocol is aimed at compromising the random function. By 
compromising the random function, an adversary can gain access to sensitive information 
being transmitted across the sensor network. Section 4.5 describes the identification 
process of the attacks possible and vulnerabilities present in the sensor network.
Let us consider the case where a HELLO attack has been mounted on the 
wanderer protocol. Considering figures 9, 10 we can identify the intended states and the 
actual states of such an attack.
Intended States – A, B, C, D, E
Actual States – A, B, C, D, E, (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) HELLO
Intended Initial States – B









Actual Initial States – B, AHELLO
Intended Actions – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Actual Actions – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) HELLO
Intended Pre Conditions – HELLO packets available from the neighbors
Intended Post Conditions – Neighbor list is created to be used by the random function
Actual Pre Conditions – HELLO packets are sent by the compromised nodes and 
adversaries
Actual Post Conditions – Compromised node’s probability of being chosen as receiver is 
increased.
In a similar manner we can identify the intended and actual states, actions, 
conditions for a protocol and the mounting of a sinkholes attack or a wormhole attack by 
an adversary. 
4.4 Attack surface for a wireless sensor network with Wanderer routing protocol
utilizing LEAP
We consider the usage of LEAP along with wanderer protocol to illustrate the 
importance of the theory of attack surfaces for sensor networks. This section follows the 
same outline as was provided in section 4.2
4.4.1 LEAP
LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), is a key management 
protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing. This 
protocol restricts the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network 
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neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the 
observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have 
different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for 
meeting these different security requirements. The four encryption / decryption keys are 
explained in detail in chapter 3.
The pair-wise keys are established by the communication of two nodes taking into 
consideration that an attack has a lower bound on the time (Tatt), while the 
communication time (Tcom) is lower. 
Tcom< Tatt     
4.4.2 Salient Features of the protocol:
The salient features of the wanderer + Leap protocol is similar to that of the 
wanderer protocol illustrated in section 4.2.1.
This protocol provides a security encryption/decryption mechanism (LEAP) in 
addition to the features provided by the wanderer protocol.
4.4.3 Working of the Protocol:
The intrinsic working details of the wanderer protocol with LEAP can be seen 
from a suitable working diagram. From the representation, we will be able to understand 
the frailties present in the protocol. Security issues will become apparent from the 





This is the state which represents the initial state of the sensor network. No 
transmissions take place in this state. This is the state where the individual keys are 
pre –deployed for each of the sensor nodes before the sensor nodes are placed in the 
testing environment. The sensor network just waits for some events to take place so 
that transmission of data packets is necessary to report the events. The leaf nodes may 
also be waiting for a request message from a base station. 
 A1
Upon receiving a message from the base station the leaf node enters the next stage 
to transmit the requested information. The message obtained from the base station is 
decrypted with the individual key already assigned in stage A. This is done as per 
LEAP.
 A2
Pair wise keys are established so that cluster keys and group keys can be 
established as per LEAP. This is the stage where all the keys are for available for the 
entire network.
 B
This is the stage which represents that the request message from the base station 
has been received by the leaf node. All security constraints have been satisfied as per 
LEAP usage of the individual key. This is the stage, which also corresponds to the 
73
necessity of leaf nodes having to transmit data packets to report the occurrence of 
events to the base station. 
 C 
This is the stage where the leaf node has the required information for 
transmission. The information to be transmitted will be suitably wrapped into data 
packets in the following stages which will be interpreted by the base station as the 
occurrence of certain events. 
 C1
This message is encrypted with the use of cluster keys which is common for 
neighbor nodes. The encrypted message is ready to be transmitted to the ‘receiver’ 
chosen from the list of neighbors.
 D
This stage corresponds to the availability of the neighbor list in the leaf node. A 
neighbor list is required so that the ‘receiver’ can be chosen to be the next node in the 
routing path.
 E 
This stage is responsible for packing the encrypted information requested into 
packets. These packets can be interpreted by the base station to correspond to various 
scenarios and events. 
 F
The receiver is determined using the random function from the neighbor list. Care 
is taken so that the sender is not again chosen to be the receiver else the packet may 
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just loop across the two nodes without traversing in the forward direction. This is 
explained in the next section.
Figure 13: Wanderer Protocol + LEAP Model
 G
The ID of the source leaf node is also added to the packet to prevent the looping 
of the packets between the 2 nodes. The ID of the receiver chosen using the random 
function is stored along with the packet. This ID is added to the packet so that only 
the receiver can transmit the packets to its neighbors. This is the policy used in the 
wanderer protocol. 
























The packet is transmitted to all the neighbor nodes present in the neighbor list.
Each neighbor node receives the transmitted packet but confirms its identity as the 
receiver before transmitting the packet again. The transmitted packet is decrypted 
using the cluster key mechanism as explained in LEAP.
 I
The source node ID is stripped from the packet so that the receiver for the next 
stage of transmission will not be the source node. The receiver node is taken from the 
packet so that only the receiver node has the packet ready for the next stage of 
transmission. 
 J
The receiver has the packet ready for further transmission. All the IDs which were 
initially packed with the data packet are stripped off. Thus the packet is ready for 
transmission to the next node on the routing path. The packet is now added with the 
original source ID, the current node ID, the new Receiver node ID.
      (Source ID +Intermediate ID+ new Receiver ID + Packet)
 K
This is the final stage of the routing protocol where in the sensor network, the 
required packet has been received at the base station. After the packet has been 
received at the base station the network enters the initial state A or B. It enters A 
when new sensor nodes have been deployed. It enters B in the case of the same sensor 
nodes being present in the sensor network.
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Actions:
1 – Message transmitted from the base station to the individual sensor node
2 – Information to be sent is collected
3 – Dynamic update of the neighbors list
4 – Attach the source ID
5 – Make use of the random function to determine the receiver
6 – Attach the receiver ID
7 – Transmit the packet to all neighbors
8 – Check if the current node is the receiver node ID
9 – Attach the node’s ID as the current intermediate node ID 
10 – The information is ready for transmission
11 – If the destination is the base station then the sensor network reaches its final state
12 – Timeout makes the base station, request for information from the sensor node, if 
new nodes have been deployed then the keys will have to be assigned for the new nodes.
12i – There are no new sensor nodes deployed so the same set will have to be used for the 
next transmission.
i. Pre-Deployment of Individual keys for direct communication between the base 
station and the sensor node
ii. Encryption of the requested information to be transmitted.
iii. Decryption of the requested information received.
iv. Pair-wise keys, cluster keys, group keys are established.
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4.4.4 Transmissions:
 It is preferred to obtain a new node as a receiver; by using the random function 
i.e. priority is given to the new node rather than the immediate source (the node 
which transmitted the packet to the current active node in the first place). The 
immediate source is usually prevented from being the receiver; else there is a 
possibility of cycles present between the nodes which is not a desired facet of the 
protocol.
 At any instant of time there can only be one node with an active status. A node 
becomes the active node when it receives a packet from another node. The 
information of the immediate source is usually stored at each active node, so that 
it can be made use of while choosing a receiver.
 The keys are generated before any transmission takes place. The individual keys 
are pre deployed for each sensor node. The pair-wise keys are established and the 
using it the cluster and group keys are established as per LEAP. 
 The pair-wise keys that are generated between the nodes are erased after a time 
limit (a design parameter) so that any compromised node can be removed by 
simply dropping the keys generated.
 An adversary will be able to access the keying materials but it will not be able to 
inject or decrypt the messages that are being transmitted in the network. This will 
be clear when analyzing the threat models.
 HELLO / Sybil attacks which are possible in the wanderer protocol can be 
prevented by the security mechanism provided by LEAP. The initial attack by any 
adversary on the wanderer protocol is carried out by the HELLO / Sybil attacks.
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Since, the use of LEAP reduces the risk of HELLO attacks being mounted; we 
will be able to reduce the risks of sinkhole and wormhole. 
 Selective forwarding is prevented by the need to synchronize the keys with the 
base station at frequent intervals. If a node has been compromised, it will not be 
able to resynchronize its keys with its neighbors, group or the base station. Thus 
the risk of selective forwarding being mounted is reduced.
This is illustrated by the notion of attack surfaces in the following sections.
4.5 Example of Attack Surface
The previous sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 provided us with the transition diagrams for the 
two variants of the wanderer protocol along with the attacks – hello, sinkhole, wormhole. 
This example illustrates the property of attack surfaces with reference to the previously 
explained variants of the wanderer protocol. 
We model the system, the attack model as state machines:
System = (SS, IS, AS, TS)
Threat = (ST, IT, AT, TT)
4.5.1 Wanderer Protocol
From the transition diagram Fig 9, provided in section 4.2, we have
 Swanderer, = {set of states}
               = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K}
 Iwanderer = {set of initial states}
 = {A}
79
 Awanderer = {set of actions}
  = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}
 Twanderer = {set of transition relations} 
= {(A,1,B),(B,2,C),(C,3,D),(D,4,E),(E,5,F),(F,6,G),(G,7,H),(H,8,I),(I,9,J),            
(I,11,K),(K,12,A)}
4.5.2 Wanderer + LEAP Protocol
From the transition diagram Fig 13 provided in the section 4.4, we have
 Swanderer+LEAP = {set of states}
               = {A,A1,A2,B,C,C1,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K}
 Iwanderer+LEAP = {set of initial states}
 = {A}
 Awanderer+LEAP = {set of actions}
  = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,i,ii,iii,iv,12i}
 Twanderer+LEAP = {set of transition relations} 
= {(A,i,A1),(A1,iv,A2),(A2,1,B),(B,2,C),(C,ii,C1),(C1,3,D),(D,4,E),
      (E,5,F),(F,6,G),(G,7,H),(H,8,I),(I,9,J),(I,11,K),(K,12,A),(K,12i,B)}
4.5.3 Attacks
Let us see the individual sets for each attack model. 
 HELLO/Sybil Attack (Fig 10)
 STi = {set of states}
      = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G}
 ITi = {set of initial states}
     = {A}
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 ATi = {set of actions}
= {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
 TTi = {set of transition relations} 
= {(A,1,B),(B,2,C),(C,3,D),(D,4,E),(C,7,F),(F,8,G),(D,6,C),(G,5,A),
     (E, 9, A)}
 Sinkholes Attack (Fig 11)
 STi = {set of states}
      = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G}
 ITi = {set of initial states}
     = {A}
 ATi = {set of actions}
= {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
 TTi = {set of transition relations} 
= {(A,1,B),(B,2,C),(C,3,D),(D,4,E),(C,7,F),(F,8,G),(D,6,C),(G,5,A),
     (E, 9, A)}
 Wormholes Attack (Fig 12)
 STi = {set of states}
      = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G}
 ITi = {set of initial states}
     = {A}
 ATi = {set of actions}
= {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}
 TTi = {set of transition relations} 
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= {(A,1,B),(B,2,C),(C,3,D),(D,4,E),(C,7,F),(F,8,G),(D,6,C),(G,5,C),
     (E, 9, A), (G, 10, A)}
Definition 1:
A protocol P is vulnerable to an attack i if there exist a set of preconditions pre-cond on a 
set of states  Ss  SP which when satisfied leads to states Ss where Ss = ITi and the set of 
post-conditions post-cond required to launch an attack are met.  
Ss is the set of states that the protocol P enters as a result of the attacks mounted. Sp is the 
set of states that the protocol P enters in its secure mode of execution. ITi is the set of 
initial states from which the protocol starts its new cycle of transmitting information 
packets.
When a packet transmission makes the sensor network enter one of the states of Ss, where 
that state is an initial state ITi (the pre conditions and post conditions are satisfied for an 
attack to be mounted).
Wanderer Protocol:
For example, in the wanderer protocol the pre-conditions that have to be satisfied 
are the action to request the neighbor list.  This leads to state B which becomes 
vulnerable to an attack only if in the post-condition the presence of compromised nodes is 
met. If the Pre-conditions are not satisfied, the node will never enter that state. Similarly, 
if the post-conditions are not satisfied, the node is not vulnerable to an attack. 
Using this definition, we see that the state B in the protocol transition diagrams 
figure 9 is the vulnerable state for the HELLO/Sybil (figure 10), sinkhole (figure 11) and 
wormhole attacks (figure 12).
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B in the wanderer protocol is equivalent to A of the attack models as explained in 
the attack models section 4.3.





Wanderer + Leap Protocol:




The set ITi is empty because the preconditions and post conditions for a state Ss 
did not match with any of the states of IT. Thus, we can see the feasibility of this attack 
surface model in identifying vulnerabilities and defending against attacks. 
With LEAP available, the state B is made robust i.e. less vulnerable to the attacks 
namely, HELLO/Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, wormhole attack.
Definition 2:
A protocol P is vulnerable to a series of multiple attacks 1, 2, …, n at the same 
time  if there exists a set of pre-conditions that the lead to states Ss  SP such that Ss = IT1
and for each attack i  j, there exists a set of states Ssi  STi such that Ssi = ITj and the set 
of attack post-conditions are satisfied. 
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Usually, a protocol is vulnerable to only one attack – a protocol is usually not 
vulnerable to a series of attacks at the same time.  
In the Wanderer protocol it is possible for attacks to take place in sequence. The 
HELLO/Sybil attack is mounted first which can then be used as pre conditions for the 
sink hole or the wormhole attack.
 If the adversaries are different with unique motives then multiple attacks can be 
mounted. One adversary can mount a HELLO attack while the other at the same time can 
indulge in a jamming attack which works on the physical layer of the network.
With the use of LEAP as a third dimension it is not possible for multiple attacks 
to take place at the same time on the Wanderer protocol. The presence of different keys 
present for different types of messages reduces the vulnerability associated with the 
wanderer protocol. 
4.6 Conclusion
An approach of creating an attack surface for sensor networks to study the secure 
and vulnerable features has been proposed in this chapter. Some defense mechanisms 
have been identified for various attacks possible on sensor networks. The mechanisms 
can be deployed if they can be implemented. Implementation of these mechanisms 
depends on the hardware and software details of the sensor network. 
Making use of the dimensions of an attack surface created, we are able to measure 
and increase the security features of the sensor network. This method of fine tuning the 
dimensions is explained in chapter 6. The chapter illustrates an example where the base 
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station (central processing system) has to consider readings or data from several sensor 
networks deploying different security service specific communication protocols.
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CHAPTER V
QoS SURFACE FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
5.1 Introduction
The notion of QoS is a guarantee by the network to satisfy a set of predetermined 
service performance constraints for the user in terms of the end-to-end delay statistics, 
available bandwidth, and probability of packet loss. When mobility grows high, the 
established routes are susceptible to link failures, diversions, or decrease of throughput. 
Thus, absolute throughput or delay bounds are hard to guarantee.
Most routing protocols proposed function on a best effort basis with no attempt to 
provide any Quality of Service (QoS). Routing can inform a source node of the 
bandwidth and QoS availability of a destination node. Therefore, some researchers have 
proposed the notion of soft QoS. Soft QoS means that after the connection has been set 
up, there may exist transient periods of time when QoS specification is not honored. The 
level of QoS satisfaction is represented as the fraction of total disruption time over the 
total connection time. This ratio should be higher than a threshold [2] which is required 
for the smooth functioning of the routing protocol employed in the network.
The essential task is to find a suitable path through the network, or route, between 
the source and destination(s) that will have the necessary available resources to meet the 
QoS constraints for the desired service. 
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The task of resource request, identification, and reservation is the other 
indispensable ingredient of QoS. QoS routing is a complex and difficult issue because of 
the dynamic nature of the network topology and generally imprecise network state 
information [23].
This work proposes QoS surface similar to that of an attack surface created 
previously. A QoS surface shows the expected QoS that can be delivered by the protocol.
There is a tradeoff between the security and the quality of service provided on a sensor 
network. To facilitate the easy understanding of the proposed QoS surface, we have 
concentrated on ODRP which provides an optimum level of QoS. 
The QoS surface for ODRP protocol is modeled similar to Wanderer Protocol in 
chapter IV. The dimensions considered for the QoS surface are inhibitors, enhancers, 
bottlenecks. The chapter provides QoS feature models similar to the threat models. Our 
approach enables us to identify the QoS features provided by the protocol with the help 
of state transition diagrams. The state transition diagram of the protocol is reduced to one 
of the state transition diagrams of the QoS features. If this reduction is successful, then 
we can conclude that the protocol provides the corresponding QoS feature. We show our 
approach to be successful in identifying and enhancing the QoS features present in the 
protocol.
5.2 Difficulty of providing high QoS
 Resource limitations – bandwidth, node energy
 Contention for bandwidth
 Absence of a centralized control/infrastructure
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 Time varying links
 Presence of enormous amounts of data
Node count Associated with a base station:
An optimum number of sensor nodes will have to be associated with the base 
station. There can be a number of base stations present in the network. For data 
aggregation and analysis, a node is associated with a small subset of base stations only.
In this regard there is a necessity for increasing the lifetime of the individual nodes 
thereby increasing the life of the entire network as well. The lifetime of the network can 
be enhanced as follows:
 Providing a power down option with the individual nodes so that they can 
conserve their energy in the long run.
 A base station has to decide on the number of nodes that has to be active, so that 
there is sufficient transfer of data for carrying out a particular task.
5.3 QoS Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks ODRP (On-Demand Delay 
Constrained Unicast Routing Protocol) [23]
The design of this protocol concentrates on the operations at the network layer. 
The sensor network routing protocol is powered with capabilities like the determining of 
the resource availability on the neighboring links and the availability of such resource 
reservation functions in each node.
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5.3.1 Routing Information
 Each node maintains a distance vector consisting of |V| - 1 entries for every other 
node in the sensor network.
 The entry for a node ‘v’ at a node ‘u’ (u <> v) has the following information:
1. Identifier for the node ‘v’
2. The shortest distance from ‘u’ to ‘v’ (in hop count)
3. The next hop of ‘u’ along the above mentioned shortest path to ‘v’
 The vector present at each node is obtained by making use of a suitable proactive 
wide area distance vector routing protocol in the network.
 The vector is used by ODRP in the route searching phases (to propagate in the 
promising direction) to prevent pure flooding.
5.3.2 Strategies
ODRP is designed to effectively reduce the communication overhead consumed 
in acquiring a low-cost delay-constrained path while achieving high route acquisition 




 Link-Delay based scheduling of packet forwarding
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Hybrid Routing
 This strategy first probes the feasibility of the min-hop path connecting the 
source-destination pair of an incoming QOS request. If the path is feasible the 
path is returned.
 If the path is not feasible then a destination-initiated route searching process 
through restricted flooding is initiated.
Directional Search
 This strategy restricts the search range of the route searching process. Thus the 
rate at which the expensive flooding operations are enforced can be greatly 
reduced.
Link Delay Based Scheduling
 This strategy is for an intermediate node to decide on when it retransmits a Route 
Request (RREQ) packet it receives. 
 In ODRP this retransmission is scheduled at a speed proportional to the delay of 
the link over which the packet was received.
 In the presence of multiple RREQ, the RREQ with the least delay value is chosen.
 If the scheduling functions at the various nodes are the same, a low delay path can 
be acquired as a result of such collaborative operations at intermediate nodes. (A 
blind flooding process does not lead to a delay-constrained path (though 
available) due to the potentially chaotic propagations of RREQ.
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5.3.3 Operations
The operation of ODRP can be divided into two phases. 
 Probe the feasibility of the min-hop path
 If not feasible, perform destination-initiated route discovery.
Phase I: Probing the feasibility of the Min-Hop Path
 The source ‘s’ initiates a process to acquire a constrained path upon receiving a 
request for a route to a destination ‘d’ subject to the constraint Δ.
 Source‘s’ sends a probe packet directly to‘d’ along the min-hop path connecting 
them and starts a timer.
 The probe packet gathers the accumulated delay information when propagating 
along the path.
 When destination‘d’ receives the packet, it checks for the delay constraint, if the 
constraint is satisfied then a constrained path has been identified. It sends an ACK 
back to the source along the reverse path.
 This ACK packet makes the necessary entries and reserves the required resources 
at each intermediate node.
 When the source‘s’ receives the ACK, it can send data packets along the path. 
Thus, we get a least cost constrained path for the request.
Phase II: Destination-Initiated Route Discovery for a Delay-Constrained Path
 The second phase is initiated if the min-hop path is not feasible.
 Destination ‘d’ initiates a path discovery process by flooding a RREQ packet 
which contains the following information:
1. Identifiers of source‘s’ and destination‘d’.
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2. A session ID and a sequence number, as copied from the probe message d 
received.
3. Delay constraint Δ.
4. The accumulated delay on the path probed so far, which is initially zero.
5. Search Scope Limit D = MinHop(d, s) + H, where MinHop(d, s) is the 
min-hop distance from ‘d’ to ‘s’ and H is a small positive integer.
6. A flag F when set indicates the destination initiated property of the routing 
process. 
An intermediate node ‘x’ determines whether it accepts the incoming RREQ or 
not. The preconditions under which ‘x’ accepts the RREQ packet are as follows:
 MinHop(x, s) + MinHop(x, d) ≤ Δ (to check whether the node ‘x’ is located inside 
a predetermined searching range i.e. the directional search strategy).
 Delay (p) ≤ d (to ensure the non-violation of the given delay constraint).
 Node ‘x’ receives the RREQ for the first time or the packet has a lower delay than 
those received earlier (to ensure that an intermediate node forwards only the 
RREQ carrying the least delay value among those it receives).
Once the node ‘x’ accepts the RREQ, it schedules its re-broadcasting of the 
packet with a delay proportional to the delay of the incoming link over which the packet 
was received. As the packet is broadcasted, it updates the delay value on the sub path 
discovered so far. Node ‘x’ records its next hop as the neighboring node from which it 
received the RREQ carrying the least delay value and ignores the further duplicate 
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incoming RREQ belonging to the request. So each node in the network forwards the 
RREQ at most once.
The first sent data packet will reserve resources at intermediate nodes along the 
path, if timed out without receiving a corresponding acknowledgement, the source ‘s’ 
sends data packets as best effort traffic along the min-hop path or performs QOS 
renegotiation.
The above said protocol has the following desirable features:
 Path discovery through restricted flooding is enforced only when the min-hop 
path does not meet the delay requirements, which reduces the communication 
overhead.
 Route searching process is directed and restricted by a predetermined searching 
range limit. This reduces the communication overhead if H is properly set. This 
routing process degenerates to a network wide flooding if H is set to infinity.
5.3.4 Path Maintenance
When there is a broken link the upstream destination node‘d’ sends a RERR to the 
downstream source‘s’. Then the source‘s’ send a release message to the intermediate 
nods to release the resources reserved earlier and remove the entries made previously. 
The broken state of the link can be determined by the absence of HELLO packets from 
the upstream node for a certain period of time. Upon receiving the RRER message the 
source‘s’ enforces a route discovery process if it still has packets to send to the 
destination node of the session.
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m: Average number of one-hop neighbors of a node.
|V|: Number of nodes in the network.
|E|: Number of links in the network.
For a QoS route from source s to destination d subject to a path length constraint D. Here D = MinHop (d, s) + 
H. Here, MinHop (d, s) represents the min-hop distance from d to s and H is a small positive integer. The shaded 
ellipse area is the intended searching zone. Note that the distance in this figure is measured in hop count.
Figure 34: Destination-Initiated Directional Search Process in ODRP
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5.4 Working of the protocol
States
A – The initial state of the sensor network. No transmission of packets is necessary. This 
can be identified as the state where no source and destination have been identified.
B – This is the state of the network when it enters the phase 1 of the ODRP. A min hop 
path is checked for its feasibility.  
C – This is the state of the network when it enters the phase 2 of the ODRP. The min hop 
path is found to be not feasible in the previous state, so a source initiated route discovery 
process is started.
D – This is the final state of the network where the transmission of the packets along the 
least constrained path takes place.














0 – The event at which the sensor network gets ready for transmission of packets. For 
example, the power is switched on for the entire network, or the control is transferred to 
this network to gather information
1 – The need to determine the min hop path or the least cost constrained path.
2 – Phase 1 fails to provide a min hop i.e. the min hop path is found to be not feasible
3 – Phase 2 succeeds in determining the least constrained cost path
4 – Phase 1 succeeds i.e. the min hop path is found to be feasible
5 – The transmission of packets from the source to the destination was successful
6 – Link failure/Network disruptions
7 – Transmission of packets along the path determined
5.4.1 Phase 1
Figure 16: Phase 1 - ODRP Model












A – Initial State of the sensor network
B – The network enters phase 1 where the feasibility of the min hop path is determined
C – The source’s’ sends a probe packet to the destination‘d’
D – The probe packet gathers the accumulated delay along the path 
E – The accumulated delay is determined to satisfy the delay constraint imposed
F – The min hop path is not feasible so the network enters the phase 2.
Events
1 – The process is initiated by the source node to transmit the probe packet along the min 
hop path
2 – A timer is started to calculate the accumulated delay along the path
3 – The probe packet is transmitted along the min hop path
4 – The delay constraint checked with the accumulated delay along the path and is found 
to be a feasible solution
5 – The delay constraint is not satisfied.




A – The initial state where phase 1 has failed to provide the min hop path i.e. the min hop 
path was found to be not feasible. So the network enters the phase 2 of the protocol to 
provide a least cost constrained path.
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B – The destination‘d’ initiates a path discovery process.
C – The intermediate node gets ready to accept or reject the incoming RREQ packet 
based on the conditions outlined in the protocol.
D – The accepted RREQ packet is rebroadcast to the neighboring nodes
E – The RREQ reaches the source‘s’ with the delay constraint being satisfied
F – The least constrained path for the transmission of packets has been identified. The 
least constrained path is the path that satisfies the delay constraints present in the 
network. This state refers to the best effort path being taken in situations where, a least 
constrained path could not be determined successfully.
G – Data packets are sent as best effort traffic when the operations are timed out due to 
absence of ACK messages.
H – The network enters the path maintenance state when there is a link error (broken 
links etc.). Phase 2 is responsible for both route discovery and path maintenance [23].  
I – The resources reserved at each intermediate node are released by the release message 
and the network reaches the initial state at which phase 2 started.
Actions
1 – The destination‘d’ initiates a route discovery process.
2 – The incoming RREQ packet is checked to determine if the packet is acceptable i.e. if 
it is the newest packet, if it is then it is accepted else not accepted
3 – The RREQ packet is transmitted, the delay value is updated
4 – The source‘s’ receives the RREQ packet from the destination through various hops 
along the network.
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5 – The first sent data packet reserves the resources along the path identified in the 
previous stage.
6 – No acknowledgement message or the operation has been timed out.
Figure 17: Phase 2 - ODRP Model
7 – In case of a broken link a RERR message is sent from the source to the destination of 
the session. This broken link can be identified by the absence of HELLO packets or data 
packets for a certain period of time.
8 – A release message is sent from the source to the destination which releases the 
resources along the intermediate nodes at which reservations and entries were made.
9 – After RERR has been sent if packets are still pending to be sent to the destination the 
source initiates a route discovery process which takes the network to the initial state of 
phase 2.
















5.5 Dimensions of a QOS surface
Similar to identifying the dimensions of an attack surface, we have modeled the 
QoS surface of the sensor network using dimensions. The dimensions have been 
identified with respect to the factors affecting the QOS of the sensor network as described 
in QOS Challenges (Section 3.3.4). Also from the state transition diagrams we can 
identify the various dimensions.
Inhibitors
The inhibitors are the features by which QOS can be affected. In ODRP we can 
see that the distance between the nodes plays an important role in determining the 
feasibility of the min hop path. The buffer limitation at each node inhibits the QOS of the 
network. The physical distance between the nodes affects the QOS because the min hop 
path depends on it. The effect of inhibitors will have to be kept at a minimum to attain an 
optimum level of QOS.
These features will be present for the entire lifetime of the network. Only fine 
tuning the parameters (hardware, software) can help in increasing the QoS of the 
network.
Enhancers
The features that enhance the QOS of the network are represented by the 
dimension of enhancers. 
When the buffer size present at each node allows for the aggregation of the 
messages sent from one node to another it reduces the power consumption of the whole 
network. This is because the transmission of the aggregate is a single transmission rather 
than individual transmission for each message.
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Further, on close study of the ODRP protocol we can see that certain features can 
be identified as enhancers. One such example is the situation where an error occurs in the 
transmission of a packet from the source to a destination. As soon as an error occurs a 
RERR message is sent down along the path so that a new path identification scheme is 
initiated. This prevents the QOS from going below a threshold value for more than a 
certain period time (till a new path has been identified). This mode prevents the loss of 
packets while using a faulty or broken connection path.
Bottlenecks
The features that have a trade off between energy and time belong to the 
dimension of bottlenecks. These bottlenecks become visible while the system is operating 
under certain conditions. The buffer size may not be sufficient at each sensor node to 
aggregate the results of its neighbors if all the neighbor nodes have data to be sent (this 
occurs only when there is a drastic impact in the environment in which it is currently 
deployed). 
These bottlenecks will affect the QOS though some improvements in certain areas 
can be achieved by tweaking the parameters. For example when we induce multi hop 
paths to be taken rather than a single hop path the time taken for the transmission of a 
packet from source to destination maybe longer but the energy maybe conserved due to 
the shorter transmissions involved.
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5.6 QOS Features
We use the term ‘QoS’ liberally – it not only refers to traditional QOS parameters 
such as delay, jitter, bandwidth, etc. it also refers to other parameters such as the 
survivability of the network – which is important for sensor networks.  
QOS features for a sensor network can be identified as 
- Guaranteed delay 
- Error Recovery 
- Survivability 
- Energy Conservation
We model both the system and the QoS as state machines:
System = (SS, IS, AS, TS)
QOS features = (SQ, IQ, AQ, TQ)
QOS features are a set of QOS parameters. Each feature can be expressed as a 
transition diagram. 
a) Error Recovery






A – Normal functioning of the sensor network
B – Error in the transmission of packets. Errors like faulty transmission of packets, 
corrupt data packets, failure to send the requested data packets within the timeout period, 
failure in the transmission links thus losing data packets.
C – Recover from error to continue the normal working. Recovery routines comprise of 
request for retransmission of the corrupt data packets, requesting new data from the 
remote sensor nodes through new links identified. The receiving node can determine the 
validity of data packets by using verification procedures similar to the validation of 
checksums. If this validation process results are unsuccessful then a request for new data 
packets is sent back to the sender node. 
Actions
1 – An error has occurred in the transmission of packets or normal working of the 
protocol
2 – Recovery routines are decided upon to rectify the errors. As explained in state C, one 
of the recovery routines is chosen to correct the errors in the data transmission.




A – Normal functioning of the sensor network
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B – Attack has been mounted on the sensor network. Attacks like HELLO/Sybil, 
wormhole, sinkhole can be mounted by an adversary. A brief explanation of these attacks 
has been provided in the previous chapter.
C – Recover from attack. When an attack has been mounted, depending on the time out 
interval and the unavailability of the requested packets at the base station, the base station 
requests the same packets again. So recovery from such attacks comprises of determining 
new transmission paths, avoiding the sensor nodes which have been compromised while 
determining the new paths and stopping the transfer of sensitive information to those 
sensor nodes.
D – The network recovers from the attack and normal operation continues
Figure 19: Survivability Model
Actions








2 – Recovery routines are decided upon to defend against attacks. From the recovery 
routines described in state C, the base station initiates the feasible recovery routine so that 
the extent of damage caused by the attack can be minimized.
3 – The defensive mechanisms are executed so that the sensor network enters its normal 
working mode again, the attacks are defended against but the transmission will have to 
start from the source again to avoid any discrepancies in the data packets.
4 – With the attack effects minimized, the network returns to its normal working.
5 – An attack was successful but the effects are reduced by the defensive and recovery 
mechanisms present in the network. Some defensive routines are creating an inactive area 
consisting of the compromised nodes and thus preventing any future transmissions 
reaching those sensor nodes present in the inactive area.
c) Guaranteed Delay (Energy Conservation)
Figure 20: Guaranteed Delay Model
States
A – Normal functioning of the sensor network
B – Intermediate hop transmission of packets to save energy. A single node usually will 





transmitting packets directly to the base station. When multiple hops are the only option 
in the network, we will be able to conserve energy. Energy is conserved using this 
method because the power present in a single node is sufficient to transfer data to its 
neighboring nodes rather than to a distant destination node.
C – Packet reaches the base station
Actions
1 – A packet has to be transmitted from a node to the base station.
2 – The packet is transmitted is across the intermediate nodes till it reaches the base 
station
3 – The network enters its original state after the packet reaches its destination (base 
station)
In a similar manner, other QOS features can be expressed as transition diagrams. 
Inference:
If there is some Sub-graph in the system state transition diagram of a protocol 
that matches the state transition diagram for a QoS feature, then we know that this QoS 
feature is available in the protocol. In other words, if the states present in a protocol can 
be grouped to effectively produce a state transition diagram of a QoS feature, then the 
QoS feature is said to exist in the protocol.
There is a difference between the attack surface and the QOS surface. In the 
attack surface we try to see if there is any state in the system state transition diagram that 
matches the initial state of the threat state transition diagram. In the QOS surface we see 
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if there is any sub-graph in the system state transition diagram that matches the QOS
features state transition diagram 
For example, when we consider the general transition diagram of ODRP figure 
15, the states A, B, C, D represent the execution of the protocol. Similarly consider the 
transition diagram of the Error Recovery Model figure-18; we can see that the states A, 
B, C of this transition model corresponds to the A, B, and C of figure-15. The transition
states of the two diagrams are also similar in their actions. Thus the state transition model 
of ODRP can be reduced to that of the error recovery model. This indicates that ODRP 
provides the user with the QoS feature of error recovery. Likewise, we can also see that 
ODRP provides the QoS features of survivability and Guaranteed delay (to conserve the 
battery power at each sensor node). Considering the two figures 15, 19, we can see that 
the states A, B, C and D of figure 15 correspond to the A, B, C and D of figure 19. The 
transition states are also similar in their actions. This indicates that ODRP provides the 
user with the QoS feature of survivability. Similarly, considering the figures 15, 20 the 
states A, B, C of figure 15 correspond to the states A, B, C of figure 20. Also the 
transition states are similar in their actions. This indicates that ODRP provides the user 
with the QoS feature of Guaranteed Delay.
5.7 Example for the QoS surface
We model the system, the QoS models as state machines:
System = (SS, IS, AS, TS)
QoS_features = (SQ, IQ, AQ, TQ)
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Quality of Service Surface 
SystemODRP = (SODRP, IODRP, AODRP, TODRP)
QoS_features = (SQ, IQ, AQ, TQ)
ODRP (On-Demand Delay Constrained Unicast Routing Protocol)
The subscript (i) and (ii) are used to indicate the two phases of the protocol. The 
illustrations can be seen in previous sections Figs 16, 17
 SODRP = {set of states}
     = {A(i),B(i),C(i),D(i),E(i),F(i),
          A(ii),B(ii),C(ii),D(ii),E(ii),F(ii),G(ii),H(ii),I(ii)}
 IODRP = {set of initial states}
    = {A(i)}
 AODRP = {set of actions}
= {1(i),2(i),3(i),4(i),5(i),6(i),7(i),
      1(ii),2(ii),3(ii),4(ii),5(ii),6(ii),7(ii),8(ii),9(ii)}
 TODRP = {set of transition relations}
= {(A(i),1(i),B(i)),(B(i),2(i),C(i)),(C(i),3(i),D(i)),(D(i),4(i),E(i)),
     (D(i),5(i),F(i)),(D(i),6(i),A(i)),(E(i),6(i),A(i)),(C(i),6(i),A(i)),
     (F(i),6(i),A(i)),(B(i),6(i),A(i)),
     (A(ii),1(ii),B(ii)),(B(ii),2(ii),C(ii)),(C(ii),3(ii),D(ii)),
     (D(ii),3(ii),D(ii)),(D(ii),4(ii),E(ii)),(E(ii),5(ii),F(ii)),
     (E(ii),6(ii),G(ii)),(E(ii),7(ii),H(ii)),(F(ii),7(ii),H(ii)),
  (G(ii),5(ii),F(ii)),(G(ii),7(ii),H(ii)),(H(ii),8(ii),I(ii)),(I(ii),9(ii),A(ii))}
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QoS_featuresi = (SQ, IQ, AQ, TQ)
Let us see the individual sets for each QOS model. The models have been 
illustrated in previous sections.
1. Error Recovery (Figure 18)
 SQi = {set of states}
      = {A, B, C}
 IQi = {set of initial states}
      = {A}
 AQi = {set of actions}
       = {1, 2, 3}
 TQi = {set of transition relations}
      = {(A, 1, B), (B, 2, C), (C, 3, A)}
2. Survivability(Figure 19)
 SQi = {set of states}
      = {A, B, C, D}
 IQi = {set of initial states}
      = {A}
 AQi = {set of actions}
       = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
 TQi = {set of transition relations}
      = {(A, 1, B), (B, 2, C), (C, 3, A), (C, 5, D), (D, 4, A)}
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3. Guaranteed Delay (Energy Conservation) (Figure 20)
 SQi = {set of states}
      = {A, B, C}
 IQi = {set of initial states}
      = {A}
 AQi = {set of actions}
       = {1, 2, 3}
 TQi = {set of transition relations}
      = {(A, 1, B), (B, 2, C), (C, 3, A)}
Definition 3:
A protocol P satisfies QoS requirement i if there exists a set of Pre-conditions which 
results in a set of states represented by a sub-graph Ss of SystemODRP such that Ss = 
QoS_featuresi and a set of post conditions are satisfied to meet the QoS requirements
For example, a node may not receive the required number of packets within a 
specified time due to another node upstream being out of action – this is the precondition. 
The protocol than enters a state Ss = ERROR_RECOVERY. The post-condition leads to 
RERR messages being transmitted to find an alternative path.
A sub graph is one which is present as a part of the transition diagram. 
From the figures given below the concept of sub graph becomes clear.
A1 = S1, A2 = S3, A3 = S4
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Protocol QoS1
Figure 21: Protocol Schematic Diagram
The QoS graph is a subset of the protocol graph; so we can conclude that the 
protocol will meet the requirements for QoS type 1. Similarly, when we consider the state 
transition diagram of ODRP figure 15 and survivability model figure 19 we get the 
following graphs.
ODRP Survivability
Figure 22: Protocol Schematic Diagram ODRP Vs Survivability model
Comparing the two figures 15, 22, we can see that A = S1, B = S3, C = S4, D = 
S2. Likewise, comparing the two figures 15, 20, we can see that A = A1, B = A2, C = A3,
D = A4. This representation has been provided to indicate the feasibility of determining 
the QoS features provided by ODRP. From the two graphs shown we can see that S1=A1, 
S3=A2, S4=A3, S2=A4. When we reduce the graphs of ODRP in not considering some 
of the transitions, then both the models are similar. This indicates the presence of the QoS 















A protocol P satisfies QoS  requirements 1,2,…n if there exist different preconditions that 
lead to  sub-graphs Ss1, Ss2,…, Ssn of  SystemODRP such that Ssi = QoS_featuresi for all i = 
1,2,…n and the post-conditions are satisfied .  
It is important to note that the subgraphs Ss1, Ss2,…, Ssn may not necessarily be 
disjoint as some states (nodes) may match between the different graphs. However, and 
the Pre-conditions and post-conditions will be disjoint.  
If the states present in a protocol can be grouped (reduced) to produce a state 
transition diagram equivalent to that of a QOS feature, then the QOS feature is said to
exist in the protocol. From the transition diagrams of the ODRP and the QOS models we 
can see that error recovery, survivability, guaranteed delay are provided by this ODRP 
protocol. (When certain states present in the transition diagram are combined as a single 
unit and the transition diagram is reduced accordingly we get transition diagrams similar 
to the QOS feature models.)
From the basic transition working diagram provided in the previous section 
(Figure 11) we can see that the four states A, B, C, D have the three illustrated QOS 
features as sub-graphs.
5.8 Conclusion
The approach of creating a QoS or service surface has been illustrated in this 
chapter. In a similar manner, any protocol which has been deployed to provide a specific 
service can be modeled as a surface across the dimensions. Making use of the dimensions 
of the QoS surface created, we will be able to increase the QoS of the sensor network. 
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This method of fine tuning the dimensions is explained in chapter 6. The chapter 
illustrates an example where the base station (central processing system) has to consider 
readings or data from several sensor networks deploying different service specific 
(security, QoS) communication protocols. 
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CHAPTER VI
QoAS and QoS MEASUREMENT
In this chapter we propose a mapping mechanism which allows us to measure the 
quality of security (or service) of a particular protocol in relation to that provided by the 
entire network. In our proposed approach we take the protocol that provides the highest 
level of security (or service) and compare it with the security or service provided by 
another part of the same system that is deploying another protocol. If there is a large 
difference, this indicates that security across the network is not evenly spread.   To 
compensate for this situation, the related hardware and software can be enhanced by 
modifying the appropriate dimensions. This will result in enhanced security (or service) 
for the entire system.   
We illustrate our approach by considering a situation where a central processing 
system or base station considers the readings from two sensor networks deploying two 
different routing protocols. The two different protocols under consideration are wanderer 
+ LEAP protocol and the ODRP protocol. In the following sections mappings are 
provided between the dimensions of an attack surface and the dimensions of the QOS 
surface. This illustrates the interaction between the two unique protocols on the readings 
obtained by the central processing system. The architecture takes into consideration the 
features provided in [21] [22]. This method of determining the effect of interaction
between two protocols can be extended to a number of unique protocols employed in the
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particular environment. The central processing system takes into consideration the 
readings from all the networks, deploying the unique protocols. 
Under such cases, we will be able to increase the security of the network, which 
enables the central processing system to receive less tampered data. The security of 
service of the system is increased by modifying the dimensions of the system. For 
example, the dimension of channels can be increased by one to provide more channels, 
thereby increasing the overall system security.
A sensor network that is deployed across a wide area may have several protocols 
in the network as shown below.    
Figure 23: Theoretical Sensor Network Architecture
A – WANDERER + LEAP PROTOCOL IN – DATA INPUT
B – ODRP PROTOCOL OUT – DATA OUTPUT









Different protocols provide different levels of security and quality of service.  For 
example, one protocol may provide a minimum quality of security, whereas another 
protocol in the same network may provide a very high quality of security.  
6.1 Mappings
There have been very few instances of in the literature of research being done in 
the area of bridging the application-network gap [24]. This reflects the inherent difficulty 
of making an attempt to link the quality of a protocol in terms of security or service with 
network parameters. There are three approaches which can be identified as follows:
1. Implicit Mapping
2. Explicit Mapping
3. Restricted Implicit Mapping (probes)
None of these approaches considers security. In this chapter we propose a novel 
approach to measure the quality of service or security of an individual protocol in relation 
to the overall quality of service or security of the entire system. 
We first define the dimensions of the protocols.
6.2 Attack Surface of a protocol
 Targets and Enablers (TE)
 Channels and Protocols (CP)
 Rules of access (RA)






TQN   = Total Quality of the network 
QoAS = Quality of Attack Surface
QoQS = Quality of the QOS Surface
So we have 
TQN = g (QoAS, QoQS)                                                    ------------------------- (1)
‘g’ is a function that combines the features of the attack surface with the QOS surface.
Based on our study of the attack surface for a protocol we can conclude that 
QoAS =     








            ------------------------- (2)
As shown in Equation 2, we can make use five constants b, c, d, e, and f to normalize the 
values of CPp, RAp, TEt, CPt, RAt around the value of TEp.                                                                                 
Where
           TEp is the presence factor of Targets and Enablers 
           TEt is the total presence factor of Targets and Enablers 
           CPp is the presence factor of Channels and Protocols
           CPt is the total presence factor of Channels and Protocols 
RAp is the presence factor of Rules of Access
            RAt is the total presence factor of Rules of Access
Presence factor of a dimension for an attack surface is explained in Definition 5
below and total presence factor of a dimension for an attack surface is explained in 
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Definition 6 below. The coefficients b, c, d, e and f can be effectively determined 
experimentally when studying the behavior and effects of the various dimensions 
involved in an attack surface, on the security features of the sensor network.
Equation (2) provides us the relation between the security of a sensor network and 
QoAS (Quality of Attack Surface).
Security  1/QoAS
 As the number of targets and enablers increase, the security of the network 
decreases thus increasing the quality of the attack surface.
 As the number of channels and protocols increase, the security of the network 
increases thus decreasing the quality of the attack surface.
 As the number of rules of access increase, the security of the network is enhanced 
thus decreasing the quality of the attack surface. 
Equation (2) provides us with a comparison of the presence factor of the dimensions 
identified in the attack surface with the total presence factor of the dimensions in the 
entire system. As the QoAS decreases, the security of the sensor network system is 
increased.
Definition 5
A presence factor ASki of a protocol i specifies the value of a dimension k of an attack 
surface
Presence factor of a dimension such as targets and enablers specifies the number 











 for a dimension k of an 
attack surface. The total presence factor of a dimension such as targets and enablers over 
a number of protocols specifies the total number of different targets and enablers present 
in the different protocols.  It is therefore the value of a particular dimension over all the 
protocols. 
Likewise, we take into consideration the QOS surface for a protocol.
Based on our study of the QOS surface for a protocol we can conclude that 
QoQS =     








                      ------------------------ (4)
As shown in Equation 2, we can make use five constants b, c, d, e, and f to normalize the 
values of Ep, Bp, It, Et, Bt around the value of Ip.
Where
           Ip is the presence factor of inhibitors
           It is the total presence factor of inhibitors 
           Ep is the presence factor of Enhancers
           Et is the total presence factor of Enhancers. 
Bp is the presence factor of Bottlenecks
            Bt is the total presence factor of Bottlenecks
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Presence factor of a dimension for a QoS surface is explained in Definition 7 
below and the total presence factor of a dimension for a QoS surface is explained in 
Definition 8 below. The coefficients b, c, d, e and f can be determined experimentally
when studying the behavior and effects of the various dimensions involved in a QoS 
surface, on the QoS features of the sensor network.
Equation (4) provides us the relation between the QoS of a sensor network and 
QoQS (Quality of Service Surface).
Quality of Service  QoQS
 As the number of inhibitors decrease, the QoS of the network increases thus 
increasing the quality of the QoS surface.
 As the number of enhancers increase, the QoS of the network increases thus 
increasing the quality of the QoS surface.
 As the number of bottlenecks decrease, the QoS of the network is increased thus 
increasing the quality of the attack surface. 
Equation 4 provides us with a comparison of the presence factor of the dimensions 
identified in the QoS surface with the total presence factor of the dimensions in the entire 
system. As the QoQS increases, the QoS of the sensor network system increases.
Definition 7
A presence factor QSki of a protocol i specifies the value of a dimension k of a QoS 
surface.
Presence factor of a dimension such as inhibitors specifies the number of different 
inhibitors present in the protocol.  It is therefore the value of a particular dimension.
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Definition 8







 for a dimension k of a QoS  
surface. The total presence factor of a dimension such as inhibitors over a number of 
protocols specifies the total number of different inhibitors present in the different 
protocols.  It is therefore the value of a particular dimension over all the protocols. 
6.3 Example
Consider a simple architecture for two sensor networks A1, A2 deploying the 
ODRP and the wanderer + LEAP protocol respectively (Fig 6.1). Let there be 10 nodes 
present in each network which are capable of operating at 2 different frequencies. One 
frequency will be used for the communication between the sensor nodes and the second 
frequency for communication between the base station and the sensor node.
We know that,
TQN = g (QoAS, QoQS)                                                    
For the Attack surface of the network, from equation 2, where b=c=d=e=f=1
QoAS =     








                                                (a)                                     
Let us consider the following values for the attack surface of Wanderer + LEAP (A2):
 TEp = 10 (the number of sensor nodes present)
 CPp = 2 (the number of channels - frequency for communication present) 
 RAp = 4 (the number of keys used for encryption and decryption. LEAP makes 
use of 4 different keys for communication)
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Let us consider the following values for the attack surface of ODRP (A1):
 TEp = 10 (the number of sensor nodes present)
 CPp = 2 (the number of channels present) 
 RAp = 1 (the factor to represent the absence of key based security mechanisms)
Using equation (a) for A1 and A2
QoAS (A1) = 








=11.5/13 = 0.88        
QoAS (A2) = 









 Let us reduce the number of sensor nodes in network A1 and A2 by 5 - when the 
number of sensor nodes is reduced, less number of sensor nodes is available as 
targets for adversaries.
QoAS (A1) = 









QoAS (A2) = 








=5.75/11 = 0.52 
         
 Let us increase the number of channels in ODRP network A1 and A2 by 1 - more 
channels increase the security because if one channel is compromised the other 
one can be used.   
QoAS (A1) = 








=11.33/14 = 0.80         
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QoAS (A2) = 








=10.58/17 = 0.62         
 Let us increase the number of rules of access in ODRP network A1 and A2 by 2 –
if the rules of access (constraints to be satisfied) are varied then an adversary will 
not be able to easily compromise a sensor node.
QoAS (A1) = 









QoAS (A2) = 








=10.83/15 = 0.59         
If the number of sensors is reduced, the channels increased and the access rule increased, 
the overall quality of security improves 
QoAS (A1) = 








=5.58/12 = 0.46         
QoAS (A2) = 








=5.42/15 = 0.36         
We know that as QoAS decreases the security of the network is increased. We can 
see from the above examples that the security of the network can be increased by 
changing the dimensions of the associated attack surface of the network.
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For the QoS surface of the network, from equation 4, where b=c=d=e=f=1
QoQS =     








                                                 (b)                                     
Let us consider the following values for the QoS surface of Wanderer + LEAP (A2):
 Ip = 2 (factor to indicate the encryption/decryption involved )
 Ep = 0 (factor to indicate single path) 
 Bp = 1 (the number of neighbor nodes to be considered while determining the 
receiver for the next transmission. The buffer size present in each node 
corresponds to the number of nodes that can be identified as neighbors)
From the above configuration, we can determine the QoQS for A2 as follows:
QoQS (A2) = 








=1.5/3 = 0.5        
Let us consider the following values for the QoS surface of ODRP (A1):
 Ip = 1 (factor to indicate the absence of encryption/decryption)
 Ep = 1 (factor to indicate the single path with a constraint on the distance traveled. 
The minimum value constraint for the hop count will have to be satisfied before 
the path is chosen as the transmission path) 
 Bp = 1 (A buffer is used to aggregate the data packets from neighboring nodes 
before transmitting it to the next node in the path, the buffer size is a potential 
bottleneck compromising between space and conservation of battery power)
From the above configuration, we can determine the QoQS for A1 as follows:
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QoQS (A1) = 








=3/3 = 1.0        
We can see that the QoQS for ODRP is greater than that of Wanderer + LEAP (A2). This 
indicates a higher level of QoS from the sensor network employing ODRP.






 Let us remove the encryption/decryption of messages across nodes in network A1 
and A2 to a factor 1.5 (Partially present is the condition where 
encryption/decryption is used only for the initial setting up of the neighbor list or 
the synchronization of with the base station).
QoQS (A1) = 








=2.67/3.5 = 0.77        
QoQS (A2) = 








=1.67/2.5 = 0.67        
 Let us use the minimum path constraint on the A1 and A2 protocol also.
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QoQS (A1) = 









        
QoQS (A2) = 








=2.5/4 = 0.625        
 Let us increase the size of the buffer in A1 and A2 protocol by 1, so that the 
bottleneck dimension is increased while determining the neighbor nodes.
QoQS (A1) = 









        
QoQS (A2) = 








=2/5 = 0.40        
We know that as QoQS increases the QoS of the network is increased. We can see 
from the above examples that the QoS of the network can be increased by changing the 
dimensions of the associated QoS surface of the network.
6.4 Theoretical Framework
          In the previous section, we presented an approach to measure the relative 
importance of a protocol.  We present a more detailed theoretical framework to our 
approach in this section.  
For the Attack surface of the network,
QoAS =     








               -- (2)
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Let TE, CP, RA denote the relative importance of the dimensions namely, targets 
and enablers, channels and protocols, and rules of access. In the context of our mapping 
we can consider that this total presence factor TEt, CPt, RAt reflects this importance.
So we have,
         TEt ≈ q1TE, CPt ≈ q2CP, RAt ≈ q3RA                              -- (c) 
          Here q1, q2, q3 are strictly positive such that
          q1 ≈ q2 ≈ q3
Three values of q are used to indicate that in practice there might be slight 




  (QoAS dependence on targets and enablers)
So, QoASteTEtTEp *
QoASte is the dependence of QoAS on the dimension of targets and enablers. It is a 













QoAScp is the dependence of QoAS on the dimension of channels and protocols. It is a 














QoASra is the dependence of QoAS on the dimension of rules of access. It is a fraction of 
the total value of QoAS for any sensor network system.
Using the above values 
We get,



















































                        
Similarly, for the QOS surface of the sensor network
QoQS =     








                         -- (4)
          Let I, E, B denote the relative importance of the inhibitors, enhancers, bottlenecks 
respectively. In the context of our mapping we can consider that the total presence factor 
It, Et, Bt reflects this importance.
So we have,
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         It ≈ q1I, Et ≈ q2E, Bt ≈ q3B                                     -- (d)
         
          Here q1, q2, q3 are strictly positive such that
           q1 ≈ q2 ≈ q3
Three values of q are used to indicate that in practice there might be slight deviations 













QoQSi is the dependence of QoQS on the dimension of inhibitors. It is a fraction of the 




 (QoQS dependence on enhancers)
So, QoQSeEtEp 
QoQSe is the dependence of QoQS on the dimension of enhancers. It is a fraction of the 













QoQSb is the dependence of QoQS on the dimension of bottlenecks. It is a fraction of the 
total value of QoQS for any sensor network system.
Using the above values 
We get,
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6.5 Theoretical Protocol (An effective Attack surface and an effective QOS surface)
We have identified three dimensions for the attack surface of the ‘wanderer 
protocol’ and the quality of service surface of the ‘routing protocol with ODRP. As a 
further study, let us consider the case where we develop a new protocol which combines 
the strengths of both the above protocols mentioned to achieve an acceptable degree of 
security and QOS. 
The dimensions identified for the attack surface of the wanderer protocol are as 
follows:
 Targets and Enablers
 Channels and Protocols
 Rules of access (Protection layer)
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Since we have identified three dimensions for the wanderer protocol we consider 
the case of a simple cube to express them as shown.
Let us consider the following units of size to express the length of each 
‘dimension’: 
 ‘a’ for Targets and Enablers
 ‘b’ for Channels and protocols
 ‘c’ for Rules of access
Since we are considering the case of a cube let us assume that all three 
dimensions play an equal part in determining the attack surface i.e. all dimensions are of 
the same length ‘z’ units.
        So, now we have 
abcz
With the above equivalence we can calculate the surface area of the cube to be 
‘6z2 square units’
Thus we have the surface area of a cube which indicates the attack surface area 
which can be obtained when using the properties of the wanderer protocol. The smaller 
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the attack surface area obtained for a protocol the greater the security associated with its 
usage.
Figure 24: Attack Surface with the Dimensions
Let us do the same for the QOS surface obtained by using the routing protocol 
with mobile backbones. 
QOS surface:
Since we have identified three dimensions for the QOS routing protocol let us 
consider the case of a simple cube again to express them as shown.
Let us consider the following units of size to express the length of each 
‘dimension’: 
 ‘d’ for Inhibitors
 ‘e’ for Enhancers





Figure 25: QoS Surface with the Dimensions
Since we are considering the case of a cube let us assume that all three 
dimensions play an equal part in determining the QOS surface i.e. all dimensions are of 
the same length ‘y’ units.
        So, now we have 
defy
With the above equivalence we can calculate the surface area of the cube to be 
‘6y2 square units’
Thus we have the surface area of a cube which indicates the QOS surface area 
which can be obtained when using the properties of the QOS routing protocol with 
mobile backbones. The smaller the QOS surface area obtained for a protocol the greater 
the QOS associated with its usage. The inverse of equation 4 will be considered since we 






Let us finally consider the case of the theoretical protocol. Now, let us assume 
that the dimensions are paired up as shown:
C == d, b == f, a == e. 
So every dimension will have a minimum value of ‘z’ or ‘y’ units. Let us consider ‘x’ to 
be the length of each dimension of the theoretical protocol.
Case 1: x = 2c
X = c+d (b+f, a+e)
    = 2z or 2y units
So now we have the surface area of such a cube to be 6x2 square units which is equivalent 
to 36z2 square units or 36y2 square units.
Case 2: c < x < 2c
Let p1 (a+e)/2, p2 = (b+f)/2, p3 =(c+d)/2.
            So now we have 
                   X = z + p1 units
         So the surface area of such a cube is 6x2 square units which is equivalent to 
6(z+p1)2 square units.
This will apply to all other cases for the values of ‘X’.
From the above two cases we can see that when we try combining two different 
protocols which offer a high level of performance in 2 different categories, in our case 
“security” and “QOS”, the new protocol will not efficiently match them in their 
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performances. There will be a tradeoff between the various dimensions which can result 
in a surface with larger surface areas in terms of the security and the QOS. 
This provides a unifying approach for capturing the attack surface and the QoS 




In this thesis we have proposed a mechanism to compare the relative security and 
QoS of sensor network protocols using the concept of a surface. The proposed state 
machine model is general enough to model the behavior of the system, the threats 
present, the QoS features available, the base station and the sensor nodes on the system. 
Our service surface measurement method can be applied to any sensor network system. 
The application of our metric and method to sensor networks give results that confirm 
perceived beliefs about the relative security of the communication protocols. 
In this thesis, we have extended the metric of an attack surface proposed for 
operating systems to sensor network systems. The protocols are modeled using state 
transition diagrams and we have defined state transition graphs specifying various attacks 
on sensor networks.  An attack surface models the sensor network system according to 
the dimensions identified – targets and enablers, channels and protocols, rules of access. 
We have also extended this metric to a service surface and have provided the QoS 
surface for a sensor network to indicate the feasibility of this technique. Similar to 
creating an attack surface, we have studied the details of the communication protocol and 
made use of state transition diagrams to model the protocol.
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We have defined state transition graphs for various QoS features provided in 
sensor networks. This QoS surface models the sensor network system according to the 
dimensions identified – inhibitors, enhancers and bottlenecks. 
In this work we have provided an example to illustrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed approach.  The example confirms that we can modify the dimensions involved 
with the surfaces to provide us a better level of service or security. We view our work as 
a first step towards a meaningful and practical metric for an integrated framework for 
security and QoS measurement.
Future work related to our approach will involve identifying more dimensions for 
the QoS and Security surfaces.  Experimental validation of the proposed model is also 
needed. This will include identifying vulnerabilities, QoS features and classifying them 
efficiently across the dimensions. Further work on combining and synchronizing the best 
features of multiple protocols to create an improved protocol would be another avenue 
for future work.  
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